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BACK TO THE FUTURE:
THE MANAGED CARE REVOLUTION
GAIL B. AGRAWAL* AND HOWARD R. VEIT**
I
INTRODUCTION
Revolutions that result in sudden and radical change to a society’s essential
attributes are rare occurrences.  Rather, from biology to social policy, the pres-
ent is the result of an evolutionary progression of interrelated phenomena.  The
forces that prompt a period of rapid evolution are often not apparent, except in
hindsight.  The evolutionary process, once begun, is difficult to orchestrate, and
the results hard to predict.  The evolution of the managed care industry is a case
in point.  Initiatives by the private sector and government to make medical care
accessible to a larger percentage of the population exacerbated, rather than
ameliorated, the costs of health care services.  The market-based reforms that
followed were intended to provide consumers with information and financial
incentives to make wise economical choices, but instead gave rise to a clamor of
consumer complaints, while posting only temporary gains in controlling health
care costs.  The nation is once again faced with calls for reform of its patchwork
system of health care delivery and financing.
This article provides an overview of the interrelated events that led to the
present-day managed care system.  We begin with the stimuli for change to the
longstanding medical model status quo.  A paradigmatic shift from a physician-
dominated professional model to a market-based system characterized the
revolutionary period that followed.  Before that shift could occur, however,
Congress had to abandon its regulatory zeal to create a political climate in
which policy-makers perceived market-based reform as a viable alternative to
both regulatory fiat and professional control.  Equally important to legislative
willingness was the elimination of systemic impediments to market reforms,
principally the organized resistance of the professionals who controlled the
system.  These events opened the way for suggestions about the direction that
market-driven evolution should follow and the translation of scholarly insight
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into political reality.  In this article, we revisit these events, describe the system
that evolved, and conclude with some suggestions for future directions.
II
THE PAST AS PRELUDE
The story of the pre-managed care era is one of miscues and well-inten-
tioned missteps.  Although the stirrings of the health care revolution became
readily apparent shortly after the enactment of the Medicare and Medicaid pro-
grams, both the events that gave rise to the need for change and the form that
change took had much earlier origins.  The years that preceded the managed
care era were remarkable for the juxtaposition of the relative stability and lack
of diversity among the organizational arrangements for the delivery and financ-
ing of health care services, and the rapid changes in society and medical science.
As third-party financing grew and physicians expanded their sphere of influence
to include payment mechanisms as well as health care delivery, attempts to
expand access to health care services without fundamentally changing highly
prized practice patterns led to unsustainable levels of health care spending.
The health care delivery system had long been static.  Most physicians were
self-employed, predominantly in solo practice, and the ratio between capital
and labor in the typical practice was low.1  Vertical integration of individual and
institutional providers was rare.  The result was a non-system of independent
small business bereft of any means to coordinate the delivery of medical serv-
ices to ensure their continuity, quality, or cost-effectiveness.
The efforts to finance health care services exhibited only slightly more varia-
tion.  In the early years of the twentieth century, medical services were a market
good.  As with all market goods, an individual’s access to health care services
was based primarily on her ability to buy them.  The resulting harshness to
those unable to pay was mediated by the philanthropic leanings of the wealthy
and the benevolence of physicians, but those were by no means certain.  Pre-
dictably, means to increase access to affordable medical services evolved.
Between 1900 and the early 1930s, some single institutions aligned with closed
groups of physicians to offer their health care services to employers for a fixed
periodic prepayment.2  These plans were usually ad hoc arrangements, with the
institutions and the physicians continuing their separate practices while coordi-
nating some services and offering them on a prepaid, fixed price basis.3  In addi-
tion to these partial alignments, the period before World War I saw the first
establishment of physician group practices that provided services solely on a
prepaid basis to closed panels of patients.4  Before 1933, these provider-initiated
1. See generally Victor R. Fuchs, Can the Traditional Practice of Medicine Survive?, 125
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 154 (1970) [hereinafter Fuchs, Traditional Practice].
2. Charles D. Weller, “Free Choice” as a Restraint of Trade in American Health Care Delivery and
Insurance, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1351, 1352, 1355-64 (1984).
3. Id. at 1360-64.
4. Barbara A. Shickich, Legal Consequences of the Health Maintenance Organization, in
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arrangements were the predominant means of group financing of health care
services, although they covered only a small percentage of the population.5
The Depression years highlighted the need for a systematic means of financ-
ing health care services for a greater percentage of the population than the iso-
lated provider-initiated efforts at prepaid care had achieved.  With health care
services out of reach for many, there were calls for a national health insurance
system, calls that were answered by private initiatives to provide financing for
medical services.6  The form and business practices the early third-party payers
adopted were heavily influenced by organized medicine.  The American Medi-
cal Association insisted that an all-qualified-caregivers approach was the only
ethical model for group financing of health care services; it decried the unethi-
cal nature of prepaid group practice that depended upon limited, closed physi-
cian panels.7  Physicians in prepaid provider-sponsored plans found themselves
ostracized by their professional peers.8  Over time, the market share of prepaid
health care eroded, although prepaid health care continued in some limited
geographic areas.9
In 1933, hospitals and physicians began to organize the Blue Cross plans for
coverage of hospital costs and Blue Shield plans for physician care.  These early
financing models, devised by caregivers, were created in the image of the exist-
ing physician-dominated health care delivery system.  They were organized as
non-profit entities that embraced a so-called community choice model, discour-
aging competition by permitting all qualified physicians and hospitals in the
community to participate and reflecting professional disapproval of others
profiting from the practice of medicine.10  Premiums were based on a commu-
nity rating, a tacit acceptance of the principle that the costs of illness should be
shared among the healthy and the unhealthy.11  Physicians were paid directly for
their services on the basis of their charges, limited by the amorphous and physi-
cian-determined level of the “usual, customary, and reasonable” fee in the
community.  Hospitals were paid on the basis of their incurred costs.12
Commercial insurers soon entered the health care coverage market offering
indemnity coverage at premiums based on experience rating.  They also
HEALTHCARE FACILITIES LAW 1051, 1053-60 (Anne M. Dellinger ed., 1991).
5. Weller, supra note 2, at 1363.  The vast majority of the population had no health care coverage
and paid from their personal resources or received charity care.
6. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 280-86 (1982).
7. The American Medical Association stated that prepaid practice involved “solicitation of
patients, destructive competition among professional groups, inferior medical service, loss of personal
relationship of patient and physician, and demoralization of the profession.” See BUREAU OF
ECONOMICS STAFF REPORT ON THE HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION AND ITS EFFECTS ON
COMPETITION 7 n.1 (July 1977) (quoting J. AM. MED. ASS’N, Dec. 3, 1932, at 1951).
8. See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass’n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
9. See generally Thomas Mayer & Gloria Gilbert Mayer, HMOs: Origins and Development, 312
NEW ENG. J. MED. 590 (1985).
10. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 9-1, 462-63 (2d ed. 2000); see also Weller, supra
note 2, at 1364-65.
11. STARR, supra note 6, at 309.
12. Weller, supra note 2, at 1365.
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adopted an all-provider participation model and made no attempt to influence
the services provided or the amounts charged by caregivers to their insureds.13
If the insurers had tried to exert such influence, organized medicine would
likely have blocked their efforts, in much the same way that they had stymied
early prepaid practices.
The World War II years saw a great expansion in employer-based health
care coverage, as a result of wartime wage-caps and the substitution of benefit
enhancements for salary increases.  Congress encouraged employer-based
health care coverage by amending the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to
exclude employer-provided coverage from employees’ taxable income while
permitting employers to deduct the cost of employee coverage as a business
expense.14  Conventional insurers, including commercial carriers and the service-
based Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans, became the coverage of choice for
employment-based communities of insureds.15
As the level of third-party coverage increased, public acceptance of medical
care as a market good eroded.16  In 1965, the federal government created the
Medicare program to provide public insurance to individuals sixty-five and over
and to those with certain disabilities, and joined with the states under the aus-
pices of the Medicaid program to extend health care coverage to those consid-
ered categorically or medically needy.17  Following the lead of the Blue
Cross/Blue Shield and commercial insurance plans, as well as the urgings of pro-
fessional associations, these government programs initially adopted fee-for-
service reimbursement for physician services and cost-based reimbursement for
hospital services.18
Flaws in the pre-1970s delivery system and financing mechanisms were a
powerful impetus for the health care revolution.  Because of their professional
expertise and the almost mythical regard in which their patients held them, phy-
sicians controlled both the supply of and the demand for health care services.
Patient trust coupled with the lack of readily available, comprehensible infor-
mation inhibited competition on the basis of medical quality.  Moreover, physi-
cians enjoyed de facto control over the types of insurance plans that would be
13. See STARR, supra note 6, at 204-06 (noting that group health insurance “freed the medical
profession” from corporate control).
14. See I.R.C. § 106 (1986).
15. DAVID B. SMITH, THE WHITE LABYRINTH: UNDERSTANDING THE ORGANIZATION OF
HEALTH CARE 39-41 (1975).
16. See Walter McClure, The Medical Care System under National Health Insurance: Four Models,
1 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 22, 25 (1976) [hereinafter McClure, Medical Care System] (noting that
the availability of third-party payment for medical services turned health care from a market good to
merit good).
17. For a discussion of the effect of Medicare and Medicaid legislation on the medical profession,
see Eliot Freidson, The Medical Profession in Transition, in APPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE TO
CLINICAL MEDICINE AND HEALTH POLICY 63 (Linda H. Aiken & David Mechanic eds., 1986).
18. Later, the federal government would respond to the cost-increasing effects of cost- and
charges-based methods of reimbursement and adopt a prospective payment system for hospital
reimbursement and a resource-based relative value scale to set physician payment.
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available to consumers.19  The practical effect of the all-qualified-caregivers’
model of health care coverage was an almost total elimination of competition
among physicians on the basis of price.20  In an earlier era, when patients were
responsible for a significant portion of their medical bills, the physician’s medi-
cal largess was tempered by the patient’s financial limitations.  The availability
of third-party payers, however, decreased the price sensitivity of physician and
patient.  Consumer-insensitivity to cost predictably led to higher charges, which
made third-party coverage more attractive.  Although the employer group
seemed a sensible method for creating a community of insureds, and employer-
paid coverage an expedient way to provide financing for health care services,
these practices exacerbated insured employees’ insensitivity to the costs of both
medical services and insurance coverage.  Federal tax policy contributed to the
difficulties as insured employees sought ever-increasing levels of employer-pro-
vided coverage to take advantage of the ability to pay for health care services
with pre-tax dollars.21
While conventional insurers enjoyed early marketplace successes, they
adopted business practices that produced unanticipated harmful effects else-
where in the system.  Cost-based reimbursement for hospital services encour-
aged hospitals to incur greater costs.  Because health care insurance provided
generous coverage for hospital services and frequently did not pay for outpa-
tient services, patients and physicians preferred inpatient to less costly outpa-
tient care.  Combined with the availability of funding under the Hill-Burton
Act, hospitals, the most costly option for care delivery, became the locus of care
in large and small communities.  Health care spending increased, and with it
came a necessary increase in health care premiums and greater need for health
care coverage.
Aided by the ready infusion of money from third-party payers, the late
1960s began a period of medical technological revolution with the development
of new diagnostic and therapeutic tools.  Despite the nation’s already significant
investment in health care, however, flaws began to appear in the “best health
care system in the world.”  With new medical interventions came the opportu-
nity for choice among treatment modalities.22  The speed with which these new
interventions developed made clinical effectiveness difficult to verify.  Physician
autonomy over clinical practice resulted in wide variations in medical practice
not associated with improved outcomes or differential medical need.  The deliv-
19. See Hearing on H.R. 5740 Before the House Subcomm. on Health, Ways & Means Comm.
[hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 5740], 96th Cong. 126 (1980) (statement of Clark C. Havighurst).
20. See ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN 23 (1980); see also Am. Med. Ass’n v. United States,
130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff’d 317 U.S. 519 (1943) (AMA and affiliated doctors conspired to
prevent an early prepaid plan from obtaining and retaining physician staff).
21. Clark Havighurst, Contract Failure in the Market for Health Services, 29 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 47, 57-59 (1994).
22. Alain C. Enthoven, Theory and Practice of Managed Competition in Health Care Finance, 9
PROFESSOR DR. F. DE VRIES LECTURES IN ECONOMICS: THEORY, INSTITUTIONS, POLICY 23 (1988)
[hereinafter Enthoven, Theory and Practice] (“[M]edicine increasingly involves choices among costly
and powerful technologies.”).
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ery system was increasingly characterized by large numbers of seemingly inap-
propriate medical interventions and unnecessary, or inappropriately long, hos-
pital stays.23  The predominant solo practice model did not lend itself either to
outcomes measurements to assess the quality of care that resulted from clinical
variability or to implementation of improvements if quality problems were
identified.
Population growth, particularly among the aged and the poor, and steady
increases in urbanization and industrialization soon led to an inequitable geo-
graphic distribution of health care manpower and resources, with more affluent
citizens in suburban and urban areas having greater access to medical services
than other citizens.24  The financial and psychic rewards associated with
increased specialization resulted in a physician maldistribution, with more spe-
cialists and fewer generalists than were optimal to meet community medical
needs.25  The result was a costly, two-tiered, fragmented delivery system.26
III
THE REVOLUTION BEGINS
In 1972, then-Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Elliot L.
Richardson declared a “health care crisis” caused by escalating health care
spending, unavailability of or inadequate access to health care services in inner
cities and rural areas, fragmented services to the medically indigent, and insuffi-
cient use of preventive measures to reduce the incidence and severity of illness.27
President Nixon called for “[a]n all-directions reform of our health care
system—so that every citizen will be able to get quality health care at reason-
able cost regardless of income and regardless of area of residency.”28 He identi-
fied health care reform as “an item of highest priority on my unfinished agenda
for America.”29  Thus, in the years before the managed care era of the 1980s and
1990s, the stated goal for an American health care revolution was high-quality
medical care available and accessible to all who needed it without regard to
their ability to pay.30
23. Paul M. Ellwood, Jr. et al., Assuring the Quality of Health Care 27-34, 53 (InterStudy 1973); see
also Alain C. Enthoven et al., Consumer Choice and the Managed Care Backlash, 27 AM. J. L. & MED.
1 (2001) [hereinafter Enthoven et al., Backlash].
24. Anne R. Somers, Some Basic Determinants of Medical Care and Health Policy, in POLITICS
AND LAW IN HEALTH CARE POLICY 307 (John B. McKinlay ed., 1973).
25. Paul M. Ellwood, Jr., Concept, Organization and Strategies of HMOs, 3 J. NURSING ADMIN. 29,
33 (1973) [hereinafter Ellwood, Concept].
26. Herman M. Somers & Anne R. Somers, Major Issues in National Health Insurance, 50
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 177, 201 (1972) [hereinafter Somers & Somers, Major Issues].
27. Health Maintenance Organization Act: Hearings on H.R. 5615 and H.R. 11728 (and all identical
bills) before the Subcomm. on Pub. Health & Env. of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign
Commerce, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1972) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 5615].
28. President Richard M. Nixon, Message from the President of the United States Relative to the
Health Care Program, H.R. DOC. NO. 92-261 (Mar. 2, 1972).
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Ellwood, Concept, supra note 25, at 30 (stating that the goal is quality health care for
all); Paul M. Ellwood, Jr., How Can Change in Methods and Interrelationships within the Health Care
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The widespread agreement on the need for change quickly dissipated, how-
ever, when the subject turned to the means to facilitate health care reform.  A
few health care scholars urged market-based reform.31  Most lawmakers
resorted to familiar regulatory approaches.  Organized medicine attempted to
retain its customary control over health care delivery and financing by resisting
increased government intervention in much the same way as it had earlier
resisted attempts at prepaid medical practice.32  For several years after the need
for change became obvious, the debate was limited to the familiar dichotomous
choice: government control or physician control.
The 1970s saw the proposal of several comprehensive regulatory models to
achieve universal health care coverage.33  Senator Edward Kennedy introduced
his “Health Security” plan in 1970, and when it did not garner the necessary
support in Congress, followed it with “Health Care for All Americans” in
1979.34  Although the details of the two proposals differed,35 both plans called for
the establishment of a federal health board that would establish and oversee a
national health policy.  Health care spending would be limited by a predeter-
mined national budget.  Funding for health care coverage would be based on
federal taxes and general revenues.  Coverage would be compulsory and uni-
versal.
Presidents Nixon and Carter proposed strategies that combined a govern-
ment role with government mandated employer coverage for employed Ameri-
Industry be Brought About?, 50 ARCH. OF PHYSICAL MED. & REHAB. 549, 551 (1969) [hereinafter
Ellwood, Change in Methods] (same); McClure, Medical Care System, supra note 16, at 23 (stating that
use of health care services should not be determined by income or personal circumstances but rather by
medical need); Somers & Somers, Major Issues, supra note 26, at 180 (advocating universal health
insurance to increase access to health care).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 54-63, 70-87, 91-93 (discussing reforms suggested by Paul
Ellwood, Alain Enthoven, Victor Fuchs, and Clark Havighurst).
32. See Mark A. Peterson, From Trust to Political Power: Interest Groups, Public Choice, and
Health Care, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & LAW 1145, 1151-53 (2001).
33. Comprehensive regulatory schemes also had their scholarly proponents.  Anne and Herman
Somers proposed a comprehensive system of universal health insurance that would have entailed
substantial government intervention in health care financing.  Underwriting and administrative pro-
cesses of private insurance carriers would be regulated, and carriers would be subject to government
approval.  The Somers model envisioned that the federal government would set a national health care
budget, establish a capitation premium for each approved carrier based on its enrolled population, and
provide financing to individuals to obtain coverage.  It would also ensure that consumers received
comprehensive information about coverage options presented in a uniform manner.  The federal
government would oversee enrollment and create appeals processes for consumers and physicians who
disagreed with decisions made by carriers.  The health care delivery system would remain separate
from the health care financing system and, in contrast to that system, free of direct government control.
See, e.g., Somers & Somers, Major Issues, supra note 26 (recommending a compulsory universal health
insurance system with comprehensive coverage and funded by the federal government).  Anne Somers
continues to support a system that depends on the federal government to provide leadership for and
oversight of a national health insurance program based on federal funding for a basic health insurance
benefit design administered locally by a limited number of government-approved carriers.  See
generally Anne R. Somers, Toward a Comprehensive Reform of U.S. Health Care, 7 HEALTH CARE L.
& ETHICS 29 (1992).
34. See ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN, supra note 20, at 158-67 (discussing the Kennedy plans).
35. The latter plan provided an enhanced role for the states.
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cans.36  Under these proposals, everyone who was not covered by employer
plans would be entitled to publicly funded health insurance.  Each of the presi-
dential proposals envisioned a federally established standardized comprehen-
sive coverage package with mandated employer and employee financial contri-
butions.37  Unlike the Kennedy plans, both the Nixon plan, based on the work of
Scott Fleming, and the later Carter plan, drawing from the work of Alain
Enthoven, incorporated competitive elements within a large centralized
system.38  A more moderate approach was reflected in the Long-Ribicoff bill
that would expand comprehensive coverage for low-income families and pro-
vide only catastrophic coverage for everyone else.  Little progress was made
toward reconciling the different strategies to develop a national insurance
system.  In the end, members of Congress showed little enthusiasm for compre-
hensive federal programs.  None garnered the necessary support.39
The use of a more limited command-and-control style regulatory model was
short-lived.  In 1971, President Richard Nixon announced an Economic Stabili-
zation Program that would freeze wages and prices for a ninety-day period.
Regulations promulgated in December of that year imposed an aggregate limit
on wages and salaries to hospital employees and an aggregate expense limit on
new technology.  Increases in physicians’ fees were prohibited for ninety days
and restricted thereafter.  Studies of the effects of the Nixon-era cost control
program yielded mixed results.  Some concluded that the cost control program
had resulted in overall cost increases, while others showed a slight decrease in
the cost per admission.40  The program expired by its own terms on April 30,
1974.
IV
SETTING THE STAGE FOR MARKET-BASED REFORM
Scholars and some legislators proposed market reform as a means to
address problems of health care spending and access.  At that time, barriers to
competition existed that would have to be addressed if market-based reform
were to achieve its goals.  Organized medicine had long discouraged competi-
tion among physicians and had used its considerable influence to shape financ-
ing mechanisms that discouraged cost-based competition among physicians and
preserved fee-for-service payment mechanisms.  State laws impeded the devel-
opment of alternative delivery systems.41  The so-called “corporate practice of
medicine” doctrine limited the ability of corporate entities, especially for-profit
36. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN, supra note 20, at 167-70.
37. Id.
38. See Enthoven, Theory and Practice, supra note 22, at 66-67.
39. The Clintons’ managed competition plan was to suffer the same fate.
40. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN, supra note 20, at 95-97 (discussing the Economic Stabilization
Program and studies of its effects on hospital spending).
41. See Clark Havighurst, Remarks on State/Federal Legal Relationships, Proceedings of the
Lawyers’ Conference on Health Maintenance Organizations, Group Health Association of America,
Inc. 55-56 (Aug. 20-21, 1971).
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entities, to employ physicians to practice medicine.  In the absence of explicit
legislation authorizing the development of alternative delivery systems that
could combine coverage with care, state insurance regulators likely would
attempt to enforce insurance laws against these new hybrid entities.
For a time, even federal law discouraged competition in health care.  In
1974, Congress enacted the National Health Planning and Resource Develop-
ment Act (“NHPRDA”).42  That statute required states to establish health
planning oversight agencies to consider requests for substantial spending on
health care resources and to grant or deny certificates of need that were
required by the legislation.  Although the process proved ineffective both at
substantially increasing access in underserved areas and at controlling health
care spending, it did empower the quasi-public health planning agencies to
favor established providers over new market entrants, even when the new
entrants offered greater efficiency.43
A series of events in the 1970s paved the way for the market-based reform
that would lead to the managed care era a decade later.  In  1973, acting on the
recommendations of health care scholars, Congress enacted the federal Health
Maintenance Organization Act, giving its imprimatur to alternative methods of
delivery and financing health care services.  Shortly thereafter, it granted these
fledgling organizations an exemption from federally mandatory health planning
and certificate of need requirements,44 evincing its willingness to rely on market
forces to allocate health care resources.  Perhaps inadvertently, through the
enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(“ERISA”), Congress also paved the way for market participants to engage in
innovative cost containment activities by limiting the ability of the states, and
private plaintiffs proceeding under state law, to impede these private mecha-
nisms to control health care spending.45
A less obvious, but no less sentinel, development originated in the judicial
branch.  In the 1975 case Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, the United States
Supreme Court rejected a “learned profession” exemption to the federal anti-
trust laws.46  This ruling empowered the Federal Trade Commission to enforce
federal antitrust laws against physicians.  Such enforcement would undercut the
ability of physician associations to continue their previously successful efforts to
ensure professional dominance of and to prevent competition in health care
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300n-6 (1974).  The statute was repealed in 1986, although some states have
retained the basic health planning structure established under the Act.
43. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN, supra note 20, at 102-05; see also PAUL M. ELLWOOD, JR., THE
HEALTH MAINTENANCE STRATEGY 19 (1970) (on file with authors) (opining that community planning
groups lack insight and authority to resolve national problems and might become advocates of the
status quo, thereby impeding basic reforms).
44. Health Planning and Resources Development Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 79-96, 92 Stat.
592.
45. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) provided limited remedies
for challenges to health plan decisions about resource use and preempted state laws and state common
law causes of action that related to employer-sponsored health benefit plans.  29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.
46. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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delivery and financing.  Four years later, in 1979, Congress rejected an effort by
President Carter to re-institute regulatory price controls on hospitals, effectively
ending the almost decade-long effort to effect change through comprehensive
government control of health care.47
As the potential for market-based reform of health care became a reality,
the quest for universal coverage faded from the forefront of the national
agenda.  If the past is the best predictor of future events, the abandonment of
national health insurance schemes in the late 1970s in favor of private initiatives
should have been predictable.  The United States had long declined to follow
the lead of other modern welfare states in developing a comprehensive national
health program, instead relying on a patchwork of private insurance and public
programs to provide health care coverage.  Nothing on the social or political
horizon of the time could have caused such a significant shift in national policy.
The national trend was in the opposite direction: When health reform was
under active debate in Congress, the nation had begun to grow skeptical about
the results that could be achieved through government regulation.  The trend
toward deregulation was underway in a variety of industries.  Moreover, there
was widespread sentiment that universal health care coverage was not economi-
cally feasible.48  Only a few short years after Medicare and Medicaid expanded
access to health care coverage, the need to control health care cost inflation was
obvious.49  Expanding the then-current style of medical practice to an ever-
increasing number of citizens would cost more than the nation was willing or
able to pay.50
V
USING MARKET INCENTIVES TO REFORM HEALTH CARE:
THREE VARIATIONS ON A THEME
Early proponents of market-based reform of the health care industry did not
speak with one voice about the goals of market-based reform or the methods
likely to achieve them.  Paul Ellwood and the InterStudy Group advocated the
use of market forces as an impetus to physicians and other health care profes-
sionals to reorganize the methods by which medical services were delivered.51
Expanding on the work of the market “re-organizers,” health care economist
Alain Enthoven focused on targeted government intervention as a means to
47. See Hearing on H.R. 5740, supra note 19.
48. This view was not uniformly accepted.  Alain Enthoven argued that Americans were already
paying for national health insurance, without getting the benefits of universal coverage due to an
inefficient, inequitable system.  See Alain C. Enthoven, Consumer-Choice Health Plan (First of Two
Parts), 298 NEW ENG. J. MED. 650, 653 (1978) [hereinafter Enthoven, Consumer-Choice, First].
49. See Joseph L. Dorsey, The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 and Prepaid Group
Practice Plans, 13 MED. CARE 1, 1 (1975) (early experience with government-sponsored programs
indicated that steps would have to be taken to control cost inflation).
50. See McClure, Medical Care System, supra note 16 (noting that cost containment was
inevitable).
51. See infra text accompanying notes 55-59, 61-66.
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address market failures and to influence the behavior of market participants to
achieve broader socially defined goals.52  He formulated a vision of managed
competition, which would years later be reexamined by the Clinton administra-
tion in its reform proposal.53  Finally, drawing on the work of neo-classical eco-
nomics, market theorists recommended the reform of health care delivery and
financing through consumer choice in a competitive marketplace.  Clark
Havighurst, writing in this Symposium, was a principal spokesperson for this
approach.
A. Using Market Forces to Reform Health Care Delivery
Paul Ellwood, a physician and founder of the Jackson Hole Group, was the
first to propose the use of competitive forces to reform the organization of
health care delivery.  Harking back to early prepaid group practices, he recom-
mended the formation of a new institutional design that would combine the
health care delivery and financing functions into a single entity.  He first called
these new institutions “medical care corporations” and later coined the term
“health maintenance organization.”54  His strategy was initially formulated
during a period when the nation’s attention was again drawn to national health
insurance.  Ellwood predicted that national health insurance would worsen the
escalation of health care spending that followed the enactment of Medicare and
Medicaid and would exacerbate the maldistribution of medical resources, both
of which had been identified during the Nixon administration as components of
the impending health care crisis.  Accordingly, his plan focused on reorganizing
the delivery of health care services to meet the needs of an increasing number
of Americans while remaining within fiscal constraints.55
Ellwood identified three key factors to his proposal for market-based
reform of the health care delivery system.56  First, physicians would have to
organize themselves into separate closed and competing groups.  Comprehen-
sive health care services would be delivered through these integrated medical
care organizations, replacing episodic care delivered by individual caregivers
and institutions.  The evolution from the existing fragmented delivery system
would provide opportunities for systematic planning and management of health
care resources that would bring rationality to health care spending.57  The inte-
gration across medical specialties would also create opportunities for improve-
52. See infra text accompanying notes 70-88.
53. Marc A. Rodwin, Managed Care and Consumer Protection: What are the Issues?, 26 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1007, 1022 (1996).
54. See, e.g., Ellwood, Change in Methods, supra note 30, at 551; Ellwood, Concept, supra note 25,
at 29.
55. Paul M. Ellwood, Jr. & Walter McClure, Health Delivery Reform, Interstudy Memorandum
(1976) (on file with authors) (“[T]here is a significant danger that NHI will seriously aggravate medical
cost escalation and the mal-distribution of health manpower and facilities if a health delivery system
strategy is not an integral part of its design.”).
56. ELLWOOD, THE HEALTH MAINTENANCE STRATEGY, supra note 43, at 12-14.
57. Paul M. Ellwood, Jr., Health Care: Should Your Company Buy it or Sell it?, 14 J.
OCCUPATIONAL MED. 667, 671 (1972).
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ment in the quality of care provided to patients through readily available spe-
cialty consultation and enhanced opportunities for peer review.  Physicians
could also benefit from in-place coverage arrangements and improved access to
capital.
Second, these organized systems would serve voluntarily enrolled individu-
als who would elect to receive their health care through a single system for a
defined period, thus creating a linked community of patients and providers.
Providers would be held accountable for meeting health care needs at the group
as well as the individual level.  Consumers who did not wish to enroll in a com-
prehensive-care plan could select a conventional insurance plan.  Consumer
selection among the integrated entities and between a comprehensive-care
model and conventional insurance would introduce competition among physi-
cians.  Ellwood anticipated that consumers would make their choices based on
the quality of care, level of service, and price, requiring physicians to be respon-
sive to all three variables.58
Third, the price for the comprehensive health care services delivered
through these newly integrated systems would be fixed and set in advance.59  A
fixed predetermined income would reverse the existing incentives of fee-for-
service medicine to provide ever more services.  The price charged to consum-
ers would reflect the efficiency of the caregivers participating in the system.
Fiscally responsible organizations would be rewarded because consumers would
be attracted to their lower premiums.  Because consumers would be prepaying
for care from an identified group of caregivers, rather than for indemnification
against the cost of care that they would have to find themselves, they would be
assured of access to needed health care services.
Although these fully integrated arrangements formed the backbone of Ell-
wood’s proposal for reforming health care delivery, he also foresaw that third-
party payers or employers might form looser health care alliances with selected
individual and institutional providers to deliver comprehensive medical services
to their constituents.  In such arrangements, the payer or employer-organizer
would bear the ultimate financial responsibility for the cost of care.  Payers
would therefore have an incentive to select only efficient providers to render
services; providers, in turn, would strive for efficiency to secure their place
within the selected group.60
The federal government’s role in market-based reform would be to encour-
age, and to remove legal barriers to, the development of alternatives to the
existing distinct delivery and financing systems.61  The market power of the
58. See Ellwood & McClure, supra note 55, at 3.
59. The Institute of Medicine stated that the key characteristic of health maintenance organizations
was fixed payment, because it was fixed payment that created financial risk and financial risk that
created incentives to avoid excessive cost and unnecessary services.  See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS: TOWARD A FAIR MARKET TEST 3 (1974) [hereinafter
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE].
60. See Ellwood & McClure, supra note 55, at 4-5.
61. ELLWOOD, THE HEALTH MAINTENANCE STRATEGY, supra note 43, at 17-20.
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government-as-purchaser could ensure that only organizations with sufficient
fiscal and professional resources would be allowed to participate in offering
their services to government beneficiaries.  Although competition and con-
sumer choice would be the hallmarks of the system, Ellwood suggested that
government mandates might be used to force employers to offer employees
choices among conventional insurers and alternative delivery systems, and tax
incentives could be devised to encourage consumers to select more efficient
delivery options.
Ellwood expressed high hopes for the achievements of competition among
conventional means of coverage and newly created organizations that combined
care and coverage.  As physicians were encouraged to form integrated systems
to compete for consumers’ business, health care organizations would change the
landscape of small entrepreneurial medicine.  To keep costs of comprehensive
care packages competitive, physicians would eliminate wasteful medical services
and would replace clinical variation with medical services of uniform quality.62
Thus, competition among integrated systems that were accountable for care and
coverage would improve health care quality.  Competitive opportunities in
medically under-served areas would address issues of maldistribution of health
care manpower.  To control health care spending, physicians would depart from
the patient primacy directive that had long characterized medical ethics to
embrace a duty to populations of patients.63  Any tendency to err unduly on the
side of the group of patients would be deterred by traditional medical ethics and
the competitive necessity to satisfy individual consumers.
There were reasons to approach Ellwood’s proposal cautiously.  Closed
panel, prepaid health care had long been beset with the hostilities of organized
medicine, whose successful lobbying efforts had translated into significant legal
hurdles to its development in many states.  One of the earliest prepaid plans,
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, warned that the theoretical benefits attributed
to a proposed shift to prepaid practice exceeded the gains that could be vali-
dated.64  When Ellwood and others began to focus on prepaid medical practice
as a solution to the nation’s health care spending and medical care access prob-
lems, prepaid group practice plans and health care foundations, principally clus-
tered on the east and west coasts, served fewer than five million citizens.65
Those citizens were not representative of the overall population.  The industry
had developed in response to employers’ desire to bring health care services to
workers and their families assigned to remote locations.66  If these new market
62. See Ellwood, Change in Methods, supra note 30, at 551 (reformed health care industry will
produce goods and services of uniform quality nationwide and will order those services at reasonably
stable prices).
63. See ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN, supra note 20, at 140-41 (medical care costs will be controlled
by the judgment of physicians, because they will accept responsibility for managing the total health care
costs of enrolled patient populations).
64. Somers & Somers, Major Issues, supra note 26, at 201 (noting Kaiser’s protest).
65. See Dorsey, supra note 49, at 9.
66. Thomas Mayer & Gloria Gilbert Mayer, HMOs: Origins and Development, 312 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 590 (1985).
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entrants were to assume a dominant role in a reformed health care system, they
would have to serve a heterogeneous population.  The differences between the
economic preferences of underserved working populations, which were the
niche of prepaid care, and affluent suburbanites, accustomed to the indemnity
insurance model, likely exceeded their similarities.  Moreover, the chronically
ill, the disabled, and the elderly were underrepresented in the prepaid working
population that was the model for scholars’ suggested market reforms.
There were also reasons for optimism about a prepaid group practice model.
The limited data available from the prepaid practices in the early 1970s showed
considerable promise in their ability to control health care spending.  Integrated
systems for delivery of health care services allowed health care organizations to
take advantage of economies of scale and to eliminate duplication of services.
Prepaid plans delivered care at less cost and paid a greater percentage of that
cost than conventional health insurance.67  Lower cost was achieved in part
because patients in prepaid plans used fewer hospital services and received a
wider range of care in a less costly outpatient setting than did patients with con-
ventional insurance.68  In some cases, physician-sponsored prepaid health care
delivered services at a cost twenty-five to thirty percent below the cost of care
delivered through the dominant health care delivery system.69
Integrating health care delivery systems also offered potential to improve
the quality of medical care.  In a closed system with a constant patient popula-
tion, peer review processes could evaluate physicians’ performance across a full
spectrum of care and on the basis of a single medical record.  Having a defined
population of patients would permit the physician to seek out the individual
patient for preventive care and to monitor compliance with treatment regimes.
It would also facilitate the evaluation of medical outcomes across a sizeable
population of patients, leading to clinical improvements as both best practices
and problems were identified.  The system would reap the financial benefits of
its improved organization and management, and the system’s enrolled popula-
tion would reap the health benefits of preventive services and coordinated
comprehensive medical care as well as share in the savings through lower pre-
miums.70  To Ellwood, a physician by training, the potential for improved quality
at lower cost, coupled with the opportunity to avoid extensive public regulation
of medical practice, proved persuasive.
67. Avedis Donabedian, An Evaluation of Prepaid Group Practices, 6 INQUIRY 3, 12-14 (1969)
(reporting that the lowest utilization rates occurred under prepaid group practice plans, and the highest
rates occurred under indemnity plans).
68. Id.; see also REGINA HERZLINGER, MARKET DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: WHO WINS, WHO
LOSES IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA’S LARGEST SERVICE INDUSTRY 116-17 (1997)
(“HMO members generally experience lower hospital admission rates and lengths of stay.”).
69. Alain C. Enthoven, A System Gone Astray, at http://www.docrates.net/feature/enthoven.htm
(last visited Feb. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Enthoven, Astray].
70. See generally Walter McClure, National Health Insurance and HMOs, 21 NURSING OUTLOOK
44, 47-48 (1973) (describing how health maintenance organizations would improve quality).
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B. Managed Competition and the Consumer Choice Health Plan
In a system he would later characterize as a “prescription” for health care
reform, Alain Enthoven proposed targeted government intervention to create a
regulated medical marketplace.71  If the perverse incentives of the pre-managed
care system could be traced to tax incentives and payment practices adopted by
private insurers and government payers, redress could come in the form of li-
mited government regulation aimed at changing those incentives and stimulat-
ing competitive forces.72  His proposed interventions addressed long-recognized
market failures in health care: consumers’ lack of information and choice.  In
addition, he proposed interventions to restrain private payers from engaging in
competitive practices that would be inconsistent with achieving broader social
goals.
Enthoven agreed with Ellwood’s recommendation that closed competing
physician organizations should be the predominant form of health care delivery
in a reformed medical marketplace.73  But he had a more diverse vision of the
forms that physician organizations might take, including: prepaid group prac-
tices, the model for Ellwood’s medical care organizations; individual practice
associations, which closely resembled Ellwood’s health care alliances; and pri-
mary-care physicians acting as care managers for their patients.74  The primary
organizational element was to be closed competing units of physicians selling
their services at charges that reflected each unit’s ability to control costs.75
While incentives for economy would be a key factor in his vision for reform,
Enthoven foresaw an “enhanced role for physicians” in controlling health care
spending beyond their own services.76  They would be required to “set priorities,
look at alternatives and make hard choices.”77  To do so, he envisioned that phy-
sicians would create and use comparative data about cost and quality, advanced
production technology to improve quality and productivity, better organiza-
tional and management techniques to coordinate care and reward wellness, and
outcomes research to improve clinical care.78  Enthoven and Ellwood seemed to
assume that changed financial incentives and government encouragement of
alternative delivery models would lead inexorably to provider-initiated change
71. See Alain C. Enthoven, The Fortune 500 Model for Health Care: Is Now the Time to Change?,
27 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 37 (2002) [hereinafter Enthoven, Fortune 500] (“[M]anaged
competition was not intended to be a ‘theory’. . .  It was a prescription.”) (emphasis in original).  See
generally Alain C. Enthoven, The Need for Fundamental Reform through Competition and Rational
Economic Incentives, ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE (1981) [hereinafter Enthoven, Fundamental Reform].
72. See Enthoven, Consumer-Choice, First, supra note 48, at 651-52.
73. Alain C. Enthoven, Consumer-Choice Health Plan (Second of Two Parts), 298 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 709, 709 (1978) [hereinafter Enthoven, Consumer-Choice, Second].
74. Id. at 710.
75. Alain C. Enthoven, Health Care Costs: Why Regulation Fails, Why Competition Works, How to
Get There from Here, NAT’L J. 885, 887 (May 26, 1979).
76. Alain C. Enthoven, The Economic Future of Health Care, 21 AM. PHARMACY (n.s.) 18, 21
(Aug. 1981).
77. Alain C. Enthoven, Shattuck Lecture—Cutting Cost Without Cutting the Quality of Care, 298
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1229, 1229 (1978).
78. Ellwood, Change in Methods, supra note 30, at 555.
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in the delivery system, and that traditional physician values would prevail in this
reformed delivery system.79
Like Ellwood’s proposed reforms, Enthoven’s plan for system-wide market
reform relied on consumer choice among the competing delivery systems and
the traditional fee-for-service sector, which, under his vision, would be greatly
diminished in size and importance relative to the most cost-effective delivery
models.  To ensure that consumers were informed about their choices, Entho-
ven proposed that the federal government intervene to require that market par-
ticipants provide uniform data in an understandable format.  Consumer choice
would be ensured by giving each family an annual choice of all or a significant
number of competing private health care financing and delivery plans, including
both prepaid plans and conventional insurance plans.  Enthoven initially rec-
ommended that the link between employment and health care coverage be sev-
ered.80  Later, he would retreat from the individual-choice model, concluding
that sponsors for groups of individuals were a more efficient means of ensuring
competition for health care coverage.81  A substantially similar guarantee of
consumer choice could be ensured by group purchasers’ offering a range of
choices to group enrollees.
Market reform, however, could not be entrusted to informed consumers
who did not have a financial stake in the decisions.  Rather, consumers would
have to be provided with financial incentives to make wise economic choices.
Enthoven’s answer was the fixed dollar subsidy.82  He offered different propos-
als for how these incentives might be created.  Under a national health insur-
ance approach, each family could receive a fixed dollar amount of financial
assistance to pay toward its choice, ensuring that consumers would participate
in savings generated by efficient caregivers.  Increased financial support from
public funds would be available only to the indigent.83
Another strategy to create consumer incentives would rely on reform of
existing federal tax laws.84  Each taxpayer would receive a fixed-amount refund-
able tax credit based on the actuarial cost of providing care to individuals in the
taxpayer’s age-gender cohort.  The indigent would receive vouchers based on
their family incomes to spend on qualified plans of their choice.  Medicare
beneficiaries would also be permitted to direct payment to a qualified plan of
their choice.  While individuals at higher risk for incurring extensive medical
expenses, who therefore would incur higher premium costs, would have the
benefit of a larger tax credit, individuals who merely selected higher cost
coverage alternatives would bear the full economic brunt of their costly choices.
79. See, e.g., Ellwood, Concept, supra note 25, at 29-30 (government should foster voluntary change
by providers to improve the delivery system to respond to consumer needs).
80. See generally Enthoven, Fundamental Reform, supra note 71.
81. See Enthoven, Fortune 500, supra note 71, at 46 (recommending that corporate purchasers
create incentives for consumers and providers to make economical choices).
82. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN, supra note 20, at 123.
83. Id. at 123-24.
84. See Enthoven, Consumer-Choice, Second, supra note 73, at 711-12.
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Government intervention would also be used to address failures in the
market for health care coverage and to ensure that the competitive marketplace
was organized in a manner intended to achieve social goals.  To ensure fairness
among competitors, all insurers and health plans would be subject to the same
rules.  Because universal coverage had been identified as a primary social aim,
each competitor would be required to accept all individuals who wished to
enroll.85  The federal government would oversee the annual open enrollment
pro-cess, ensuring that payers could neither compete on the basis of risk selec-
tion nor engage in discrimination against the elderly, the poor, and the sick.
While Enthoven was not in favor of a single benefit design, preferring instead to
create competition on that basis, he would require that every competitor offer a
low option limited to nationally defined basic benefits.86  Each competitor would
set its own premium based on the cost of providing care in its market area, and
each insurer or health plan would be required to charge the same premium to
all individuals in an actuarial category and to provide the same benefits in
exchange for that premium.  Out-of-pocket expenditures would be subject to an
annual maximum, and beyond that amount, the payer would be required to
cover all the cost for all covered services.  The result would be an explicit cross-
subsidization of the sick by the healthy, a premise readily accepted in Europe
but historically viewed with disfavor in this country.  Later, Enthoven would
explain that an unregulated “free market of health plans and individual con-
sumers is likely to be characterized by some combination of high premiums,
poor coverage. . . , and discrimination against the sick.”87  His words would
prove prophetic, as regulatory missteps inhibited market-based reform targeted
to achieve social goals.
C. Creating a Competitive Market for Health Care Services and Coverage
In keeping with the precepts of neoclassical economics, Clark Havighurst
and other market theorists recommended that the medical marketplace should
be entrusted to consumers who could choose among a wide range of health care
financing and delivery options.  Neither the prevailing indemnity model nor the
proposed HMO model offered low-cost options to consumers who might wish
to economize on the use of health care services.88  Under truly competitive con-
ditions, profit-oriented physicians and payers would offer those products and
services desired by consumers and deliver them in the least costly manner pos-
sible.  Innovation to satisfy different consumer preferences would expand the
choices offered.  Medicine, like the rest of the national economy, would reflect
and respond to consumers’ diverse preferences.
The market theorists agreed with Ellwood and Enthoven that consumers
85. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN, supra note 20, at 120-21.
86. Id.
87. Enthoven, Theory and Practice, supra note 22, at 74.
88. See Clark C. Havighurst, How the Health Care Revolution Fell Short, 65 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 55 (Autumn 2002).
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would have to be given a choice within a range of health coverage designs,89 that
they would have to have financial stake in their decisions, and that tax law that
distorted consumers’ financial incentives would have to be changed.90  The prin-
cipal point of departure between the Ellwood model and the market theorists’
vision for market-based reform was the role assigned to newly integrated units
of physicians.91  Two design options, indemnity coverage and prepaid care
offered by a small number of competitors, would not offer the same benefits for
market-based reform of health care as more intense competition.  Market theo-
rists recommended that health maintenance organizations and other organized
systems for combining the delivery and financing functions be given a “fair
market test” as one competitor in a pluralistic marketplace.92  The benefit of
these new market entrants would not be as a replacement for the prevailing
dominant fee-for-service system, but as a cost constraint on physicians and a
stimulant to innovation throughout the medical marketplace.  The introduction
of new competitors would cause both providers and third-party payers to
respond by creating new methods of delivering and financing health care serv-
ices.
Market theorists also had a more pragmatic view about the ease with which
closed integrated units of physicians would be formed.  Havighurst predicted
that health maintenance organizations and prepaid group practices would be
difficult to organize and initiate; they would require capital, commitment from
groups of like-minded caregivers, and time.  Moreover, they might not be as
attractive to consumers as other benefit designs.  Consumers accustomed to less
directive forms of health care delivery might be reluctant to enroll in them or to
abandon longstanding physician relationships in order to do so.93
Compared with other proponents of market reform, market theorists’ views
were less directive.  While the contours of the medical marketplace would no
longer be static, as they had been in the era of fee-for-service medicine financed
by passive insurers, neither could they be dictated, nor even foretold.  Consis-
tent with economic principles, the mix of health care delivery and financing
vehicles would be determined over time through the decentralized decisions of
informed consumers.
89. In keeping with his multiple-choice concept, Havighurst recommended that at least one of the
choices offered to a consumer should be a “cost sensitive health plan,” which could include closed panel
plans as well as plans that structured benefits to include consumer cost sharing.  See Hearing on H.R.
5740, supra note 19, at 139.
90. See id. at 129-30.
91. See Clark C. Havighurst & Glenn M. Hackbarth, Private Cost Containment, 300 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1298, 1298 (1979) (“Our analysis differs from common conceptions of the market strategy in that
we anticipate a greater role for private health insurance and a comparatively less central role for the
prepaid-group-practice variety of HMO.”).
92. See generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 59.
93. See Clark C. Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Health Planners, 1978
UTAH L. REV. 123, 126-29 (1978).
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VI
THE POLITICAL PATH TO MARKET-BASED REFORM
President Nixon and his senior health policy team were anxious to find a
private sector approach to health care cost control.  Influenced by scholars’ rec-
ommendations, they embraced the model of the largest prepaid group practice,
the Kaiser-Permanente Medical Care Group Program, which, like Nixon and
his senior health advisors, had its roots in California.94  Some prepaid group
practice industry experts, however, were skeptical of the administration’s goal
to move prepaid group practices from an alternative form to the mainstream of
the health delivery system.  Many of their fears were later to be realized.
Industry experts believed that, if indemnity insurers and health care provid-
ers sponsored health maintenance organizations, the principles that served as
the foundation for prepaid group practice would not survive.95  These princi-
ples—not-for-profit status, community-based premium rating, comprehensive
benefits with little patient cost-sharing, and a rigid adherence to the prepaid
group practice organizational structurewere not entirely consistent with a
competitive marketplace agenda.  Moreover, most physicians did not practice in
a manner consistent with the prepaid multispecialty group model, which was
based on quality control mechanisms that required careful selection of physi-
cians who would work in concert.96
The prepaid group-practice sector was also committed to dual choice: allowing
consumers to choose between prepaid group practice plans and traditional
insurance.97  Enrolling in prepaid group practice plans involved tradeoffs that
would not be acceptable to many consumers, foremost among them having to
select a physician who was part of the group.  Offering potential enrollees a
choice of plan design countered the criticism that prepaid group practice plans
did not provide free choice of physicians.98  Kaiser-Permanente, for example,
would participate in a group health benefits plan only if the prospective
enrollees were given a choice of benefit design.99  If prepaid group practice
94. See Hearings on H.R. 5615, supra note 27 (statement of Richard M. Nixon, President of the
United States) (“[The] new approach has two essential attributes. It brings together a comprehensive
range of medical [services] in a single organization . . . [a]nd it provides needed services for a fixed-
contract fee that is paid in advance. . . . [T]hey increase the value of services a consumer receives for
each health dollar.”).
95. Howard Veit, coauthor of this article, was Director, Office of Health Maintenance
Organizations, from 1978 to 1981.  In 1975, he served as a consultant to the federal HMO program.
During this period, he held several meetings with officials at Kaiser Permanente and with members of
the Board of the Group Health Association of American, during which they expressed grave concerns
that the federal HMO program encouraged sponsorship by organizations that would not sustain the
principles of prepaid group practice.
96. See Response of Western Clinic of Tacoma, Wash., to congressional inquiry about methods to
assure quality care in health maintenance organizations.  Health Maintenance Organizations: Questions
and Answers Relating to Subcommittee Questionnaire, Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Labor &
Pub. Welfare, United States S. 59 (Mar. 1972).
97. Jerry Phelan et al., Group Practice Prepayment: An Approach to Delivering Organized Health
Services, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 796, 799 (Autumn 1970).
98. Id. at 799-800.
99. Id. at 799.
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became the predominant means of health care delivery, as health reform
proponents suggested, the dual choice concept would be in jeopardy.
Congress seemingly paid little heed to many of these concerns.  The federal
Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 (“HMO Act”) was its first
attempt to change the underlying structure of health care delivery through the
targeted use of market forces.100  While reform-minded federal legislators
seemed to assume that the prepaid group practice model would dominate the
new industry,101 the Act permitted deviations from that model.  For example,
prepaid group practice advocates were concerned about granting federal
qualification status to Individual Practice Association (“IPA”) models for
health maintenance organizations.  IPAs were loosely affiliated networks of
mostly solo practice, fee-for-service physicians that did not offer the integration
of clinical services or acceptance of financial risk that characterized prepaid
group practice.  The American Medical Association and IPA lobbyists,
however, argued successfully that physicians would never embrace the HMO
concept unless the HMO Act included IPA model HMOs.102
As many in the prepaid group practice community had predicted, the HMO Act
proved to be a mixed blessing.  The Act provided many benefits to the industry.
It made start-up funds available to encourage the development of alternatives
to indemnity insurance and fee-for-service medicine.  To finance a five-year
demonstration program, $325 million was authorized for fiscal years 1974
through 1977.103  The Department of Health, Education and Welfare created an
office to assist in the start-up and operations of health maintenance
organizations.104  The HMO Act also protected federally qualified health
maintenance organizations from state laws that would hamper their growth,
while giving the states substantial latitude to develop legislation that would
enable a wide range of organizational forms.105  Despite its loss to the AMA on
100. See Dorsey, supra note 49, at 1 (previous laws were directed at purchase, planning, and
resource availability.).
101. When the Senate Subcommittee on Health prepared a questionnaire about health maintenance
organizations, those asked to respond included seven direct medical services providers, the Blue Cross
and Blue Shield associations, and several trade associations.  See Health Maintenance Organizations:
Questions and Answers Related to Subcommittee Questionnaire, Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on
Labor & Pub. Welfare, United States S. 59 (Mar. 1972).  The prepaid groups included Family Health
Plan of Southern California, Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, Kaiser Foundation Health
Plan, Western Clinic of Tacoma Washington, Harvard Community Health Plans, and the Harvard
Center for Community Health.  The associations included the Group Health Association, Federation of
American Hospitals, American Nurses Association, American Society of Medical Technologies, and
the American Medical Association.
102. Health Maintenance Organization and Resources Development Act of 1972, S. REP. NO. 92-
978 (July 21, 1971) (describing the AMA testimony that the HMO concept should be defined flexibly to
include a variety of organizational forms, including the IPA and foundation model).
103. See Comptroller General’s Report to Congress, Factors that Impede Progress in Implementing
the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 (Sept. 3, 1976).
104. The performance of this office was later subject to criticism for lack of coordination,
inadequate staff resources to carry out its charge, and inexperience with promulgation of regulations.
See id. at 11-20.
105. At the time of the passage of the HMO Act, three categories of state laws were viewed as
impediments to the development of HMOs: medical society approval to furnish medical services,
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the IPA issue, the fledgling HMO industry was not without its own lobbying
successes.  The Group Health Association of America successfully made the
case to Congress and the Administration that without some legislative coercion,
HMOs would never be included in employee health benefits plans, employees
would not be exposed to them, and the federal HMO initiative would fail.  As a
result, the Act included a mandated dual choice option, which gave federally
qualified health maintenance organizations the ability to mandate their way
into the marketplace for health care coverage by enabling them to require that
certain employers offer a managed care option to their employees.106
The HMO Act imposed conditions on federally qualified HMOs that would
not have evolved in a competitive marketplace, which were to prove detrimen-
tal to the HMO industry in its early years.  These requirements were similar to
those later recommended by Alain Enthoven, with one significant difference:
They applied only to health maintenance organizations that elected to pursue
federally qualified status.  The Act mandated an annual open enrollment period
during which an HMO would be required to take all applicants.107  As a result,
high-risk individuals would have easier access to federally qualified HMOs than
to other insurers.  Moreover, in keeping with the Nixon Administration’s reli-
ance on the Kaiser-Permanente model, it imposed a system of community rating
that required premiums to reflect the cost of providing care to the entire com-
munity rather than the experience of an enrolled group.108  Community rating
hampered the ability of federally qualified HMOs to use underwriting practices
to compete for groups with more favorable health-usage experience, because
such groups could purchase coverage at a lower cost from insurers and managed
care organizations that offered experience rating.
The Act established a minimum benefits package that all federally qualified
HMOs were required to offer.109  The required benefits for federally qualified
HMOs closely mirrored the comprehensive benefits offered by Kaiser-Perma-
nente and other prepaid plans that predated the HMO Act.  Mandating the use
of a rich benefits package, however, inhibited the development of lower-cost
plans.  Some consumers might have preferred lower-cost plan designs.  In addi-
tion, low-cost plans could have contributed to the achievement of near universal
physician representation on the HMO’s governing body, and insurer capitalization and insolvency
reserves.  See id. at 28-29.
106. See A Quarter Century of Health Maintenance, 280 JAMA 2059 (1988).
107. HMO Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 300e; see 42 U.S.C. § 300e-9.  All employers subject to the Fair
Labor Standards Act and employing twenty-five or more employees were required to offer their
employees the option to enroll in a health maintenance organization, when a federally qualified health
maintenance organization exercised its right to “mandate” that the employer do so.  This section came
to be known as the “dual-choice” provision.
108. 157 Pub. Law No. 93-222, § 1301.  The Secretary could waive the open enrollment period if it
would jeopardize an HMO’s economic viability.  The Comptroller General found that fifty-six percent
of HMOs surveyed said that the open enrollment requirement hurt their competitive position.
Comptroller General’s Report to Congress, supra note 103, at 31.
109. See John K. Iglehart, HMO Act Changes Advanced to Bolster Troubled Program, NAT’L J.
1161, 1165 (Aug. 16, 1975) (quoting Walter McClure’s observation that health maintenance
organizations alone cannot solve social problems with coverage for those with high medical costs).
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coverage by making coverage affordable to a wider range of groups and indi-
viduals.
The Act also limited the annual amount that patients could be charged
through copayments.  This limitation imposed an administrative burden on fed-
erally qualified HMOs.110  More importantly, the copayment limit minimized the
cost-control effect that could be achieved through patient cost sharing.
Although the requirement was consistent with prevailing practices in the pre-
paid group model, it discouraged product designs that permitted consumers to
limit the cost of coverage in exchange for higher out-of-pocket expenditures.
Thus, rather than encouraging innovation and expanding consumer choice,
when it was enacted the HMO Act was poised to have the unintended conse-
quence of impeding innovation and thereby hampering its potential to create
marketplace competition.
The implementation of the HMO Act sputtered for several years after its
enactment, due partly to the Act’s burdensome requirements and partly to
bureaucratic mismanagement.  In 1976, the HMO Act was amended to amelio-
rate some of the onerous effects of these provisions.111  The open enrollment
requirement was limited to HMOs that had been operational for at least five
years or those that had at least 50,000 enrollees and were not operating at a
financial deficit.112  Federally qualified HMOs were given four years to adopt a
community rating system.113  In 1978, Congress again amended the Act to
increase federal funds.114  The most significant change in the managed care legal
landscape, however, was to come inadvertently from the actions of state legisla-
tures.  As the states adopted enabling legislation for health maintenance organi-
zations, fewer organizations elected to pursue federally qualified status and
subject their operations to the restrictions of the HMO Act.115
Many of the HMO Act provisions—open enrollment, minimum benefits,
community rating—were consistent with the goal of achieving a “decent mini-
mum” level of coverage for all citizens, or at least all citizens with access to the
means to obtain coverage.116  Because only federally qualified HMOs were sub-
110. The Comptroller General found that fifty-six percent of HMOs surveyed believed that the
comprehensive coverage plan would make federally qualified HMOs noncompetitive.  Comptroller
General’s Report to Congress, supra note 103, at 30.
111. See Dorsey, supra note 49, at 5 (noting that the copayment cap imposed a new administrative
burden on prepaid group plans and undermined the traditional benefit of reduced paperwork).
112. Health Maintenance Organization Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-460, 90 Stat. 1945
(1976).
113. Id. at 1946.
114. Id. at 1947.
115. In March 1978, the Carter Administration, represented by Joseph Califano, then Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare, convened a meeting of business and labor leaders from around the
country to unveil the Administration’s HMO initiative and to generate support for its approach.
During the Carter years, co-author Veit, along with DHEW officials, spoke at employer and union
meetings to encourage support for HMO growth.  See JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., GOVERNING
AMERICA 167 (1981).
116. By June 1976, only seventeen HMOs had been federally qualified, twelve of which had been
assisted by federal loans through the HMO Act of 1973.  Comptroller General’s Report to Congress,
supra note 103, at 6.
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ject to the Act’s requirements, their competitive position was hampered vis-à-
vis coverage providers beyond the Act’s reach.  Since the federally mandated
benefit package was more generous—and thus more expensive—than others
offered to the same population, federally qualified HMOs were subject to
biased selection.  High-need users of health care services would be more likely
to select a federally qualified HMO, weakening their economic position.117  The
higher cost of coverage would dissuade employers from offering federally quali-
fied HMOs to their employees.  And individuals would be able to afford per-
sonal coverage. Inhibiting the HMO industry’s market share and economic suc-
cess limited its potential to facilitate voluntary market-based restructuring of
health care delivery, and also impeded progress toward universal coverage.  In
short, Congress entrusted a small segment of the health financing industry with
the large task of resolving a persistent societal problem and burdened the
emerging player with a wish list that was not imposed on other established seg-
ments of the industry.118
Four years after the passage of the HMO Act, the Carter Administration
made HMO expansion a central ingredient in its health care strategy.  To gen-
erate momentum for the stalled HMO initiative, the Administration needed the
active endorsement of employers and unions.  In the years immediately follow-
ing the passage of the HMO Act, the business community did not strongly sup-
port its implementation.119  Much of its reluctance stemmed from employers’
opposition to the mandated dual choice provision of the Act.  Most large
employers, accustomed to offering their employees a single fully insured or self-
insured indemnity plan, were not eager to include HMOs in their employee
benefits plans; their reluctance was exacerbated by a government mandate that
they do so.  Although employers complied with the letter of the law when
approached by HMOs exercising the mandate, they did not encourage employ-
ees to join HMOs.  The indemnity insurers, with long-standing business rela-
tionships with employers, feared competition from HMOs and did little to
counter this attitude.
Those friendly to the Carter Administration’s initiative had to reverse this
trend, and seemingly persuasive arguments were available to them to do so.
HMOs would allow unions to preserve broad, collectively bargained health care
benefits for their members even in the face of rapidly escalating health care
costs.  Greater competition among payers would enhance the bargaining
position of purchasers of health care coverage, putting employers in a stronger
buying position and giving employees more options.
117. “Decent minimum” is Enthoven’s term.  He defines it as all “‘cost-worthy’ medical care that
can effectively prevent or cure disease, relieve suffering and correct dysfunction.” Enthoven, Theory
and Practice, supra note 22, at 2.  The Act referred to “basic health care services,” which reflected
current practice rather than an analysis of marginal cost and marginal benefit as Enthoven proposed.
118. See Dorsey, supra note 49, at 4-6.
119. See Iglehart, supra note 109 (discussing factors contributing to problems with health
maintenance organization strategy).
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By the early 1980s, new HMOs funded through the HMO Act joined the ranks
of those that predated the federal initiative.120  Although federally funded
HMOs remained far from the mainstream of the health care system, their
presence began to generate competition between traditional insurers and
HMOs and to influence premium-pricing decisions.  Despite their misgivings,
physicians and hospitals began to compete for the opportunity to affiliate with
successful HMOs.  Health care costs continued to escalate.  During the decades
that followed the passage of the HMO Act, increasing numbers of employees
had the opportunity to enroll in HMOs.  The managed care revolution was
underway.
VII
LOOKING BACK AT MARKET-BASED REFORM
After the Reagan Administration came into office in 1981, the federal role
in health care market reform began to diminish.  The private sector assumed
the dominant role in reshaping the health care marketplace.  Commercial insur-
ers introduced HMO-like product designs, and many HMOs elected not to seek
federally qualified status.  States abandoned the laws prohibiting HMOs and
replaced them with statutes that regulated HMO operations.  As growth in the
managed care sector accelerated, states’ efforts at regulatory oversight intensi-
fied, encouraging more employers to self-insure to avoid costly state restric-
tions.  But purchasers, payers, and providers alike failed to perform as antici-
pated, and the necessary conditions for true market-based reform failed to
materialize.
A. Physicians Resist Change
Perhaps the greatest failure of the crystal ball into which early health care
reformers gazed was its prediction of physicians’ responses to efforts to increase
competition by changing the financial incentives of medicine.  Given the cen-
trality of physician behavior to the early visions for a reformed health care
delivery system, surprisingly little attention was directed to physicians and the
multiple factors that affected their professional behavior.  Clark Havighurst
correctly predicted the inherent difficulties in creating prepaid group practices
and other integrated physician organizations.121  In contrast, Ellwood’s col-
league, Walter McClure, predicted that most alternative delivery systems to
evolve under a competitive regime would be hospital-based multispecialty
group practices.122  The Mayo Clinic was a frequently mentioned model.123  Hos-
pitals and physicians would restructure their activities, McClure opined, as a
result of changes in economic incentives and pressures from large group pur-
120. See CALIFANO, supra note 115, at 166-67.
121. See supra text accompanying note 93.
122. McClure, Medical Care System, supra note 16, at 48-49.
123. Alain Enthoven has reiterated his focus on physician-sponsored medical care, citing the Mayo
Clinic as one example.  See Enthoven, Astray, supra note 69.
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chasers.124  McClure urged that private providers “need simply organize their
own delivery plan, enroll their patients, and continue to practice as usual.”125
Faced with limited budgets set in advance, Ellwood’s “medical care corpora-
tions,” based on the prepaid group practice model and dominated by physician
values, were presupposed to incorporate clinical values and engage in a cover-
age version of medical triage to eliminate wasteful and ineffective care.  Such
systems would serve their enrolled patient populations more cost and clinically
effectively.126
Victor Fuchs offered the most extensive commentary on the role of the phy-
sician in a managed care system.  He acknowledged the need for market reform
and for supplementing market forces with central control, but urged that more
would be achieved through the “custom and tradition that dominate many
aspects of medical practice and medical education.”127  Medical care and society
would be better off, he stated, if physicians played a major role in reforming the
health care system.128  He recommended that medical schools broaden their cur-
ricula to train a “continuum of personnel” and “supergeneralist” physicians
who would combine scientific and administrative knowledge and skills.129  He
advised physicians to think of health in broad terms and to consider economic
consequences in making decisions about staffing, purchasing capital equipment,
and expanding facilities.130  To achieve market-based reform, Fuchs argued that
physicians would have to accept that they must acquire “some sophistication
concerning allocation of scarce resources to meet multiple goals.”131
The majority of physicians did not organize themselves into multi-specialty
group practices and align with hospitals to provide care and with carriers to
provide business acumen, as reform proponents predicted they would.132  Fuchs’
call for a reform of medical education and an expansion of the medical con-
124. McClure, Medical Care System, supra note 16, at 49-50.
125. Walter McClure, Letter to the Editor, 58 HOSP. PROGNOSIS 6, 10 (1977).
126. See Enthoven, Astray, supra note 69 (“I envisioned organizations in which physicians would
accept responsibility for managing quality and resource use, organizations that would attract the
loyalty, commitment and responsible participation of physicians, and organizations that would partner
with health insurers to market their services.”).  Of course, no one can say with certainty that physician-
led organizations would have governed by medical values.  Rather, the new medical care organizations
may have become more like commercial carriers when they assumed the coverage role simultaneous
with the care role.
127. Victor R. Fuchs, What Kind of System for Health Care?, 45 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 281, 292
(1969) [hereinafter Fuchs, What Kind of System].
128. Victor R. Fuchs, Improving the Delivery of Health Services, 51-A J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY
407, 412 (1969) [hereinafter Fuchs, Improving the Delivery].
129. Fuchs, What Kind of System, supra note 127, at 290.
130. Id. at 289.  Fuchs disavows this economic thinking, however, when physicians are making
bedside treatment decisions.  Later scholars would concede that economic thinking must invade that
realm as well.
131. Fuchs, Improving the Delivery, supra note 128, at 412.
132. See Alain C. Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Unrealistic Expectations Born of Defective Institutions,
24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L.  931, 937 (1999) (stating that physicians failed to organize themselves to
responsibly manage the cost of medical services); see also Marsha Gold, The Changing US Health Care
System: Challenges for Responsible Public Policy, 77 MILBANK Q. 3, 15 (1999) (noting that only ten
percent of physicians practiced in groups of twenty or more in 1996).
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sciousness to population-based allocation of health care resources was not
heeded.  Instead, traditional insurers offering new managed care benefit designs
assumed the dominant role in a managed care system.  They engaged in selec-
tive physician contracting to exert control over physicians’ fees and created
incentive-based reimbursement strategies to encourage cost-conscious clinical
decision-making.133  The contracted physicians, however, were typically not
engaged in clinically integrated practices, which undermined their ability to
achieve cost savings or quality improvements through the mechanisms used by
the prepaid group practices that formed the model for proponents’ visions of
managed care.  Moreover, as the percentage of the population covered by man-
aged care organizations increased, physicians elected to contract with as many
carriers as possible to protect their patient volumes.  Patients did not want to
give up existing physician relationships when their employers changed payment
arrangements.134  Carriers, therefore, increased their attractiveness to potential
purchasers by offering wide networks of caregivers.135  Physicians divided their
services among the carriers doing business in their communities.136  The market
ideal of physicians in exclusive competing economic units through which they
delivered all or substantially all of their medical services was replaced with a
system that Enthoven had described presciently as “the least effective form of
competition.”137  With the benefit of hindsight, it is apparent that more than a
change in economic incentives would be required for physicians to accept, and
develop the skills to carry out, the expanded role delivery system reformers
envisioned for them.
B. The Failure of Conditions Precedent
Market-based reform would require that informed consumers be provided
choices among market participants offering diverse delivery and finance
options.  These conditions did not exist at the beginning of the managed care
movement, and to a significant degree they have failed to materialize nearly
three decades later, hindering efforts at market-based reform.
Although the employer-based insurance system predated the managed care
movement by more than thirty years, when employers’ and employees’ pur-
133. See generally John D. Blum, The Evolution of Physician Credentialing into Managed Care
Contracting, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 173 (1996).
134. If employers had offered a greater choice of payers, employees would have had an increased
opportunity to maintain their existing medical relationships.  Predictably, however, payers offered
employers incentives not to offer the option to choose among multiple payers.
135. Some plans selected physicians on the basis of their willingness to accept the proposed fee
arrangement and comply with carrier directives.  For some, a record of medical malpractice claims or
consumer complaints, rather than affirmative evaluations of medical outcomes, was the quality-control
mechanism of choice.
136. See Gold, supra note 132, at 15 (reporting that half of physicians participate in five or more
plans and one-fourth participate in ten or more plans).
137. Enthoven, Theory and Practice, supra note 22, at 70 (describing the least effective system as
one with ten carriers, in which all physicians in solo practice do one-tenth of their practice with each
carrier).
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chasing preferences differ, it is an imperfect substitute for consumer choice.138
Some proponents of market-based reform recommended the decoupling of
employment and health care coverage, while others recommended that employ-
ers be required to make available a range of choices among alternative delivery
systems and traditional insurers.  Neither suggestion was translated into reality:
Employers continued to select the option or options that would be offered to
their employees, and in many cases they did not provide a wide range of
choices.
Consumers continued to have insufficient information upon which to base
their choices.  To enable consumers to make an informed choice among man-
aged care organizations or between managed care models and conventional
forms of health care coverage, information should be detailed enough for a con-
sumer to understand the tradeoffs between managed care organizations and
traditional insurance and to make meaningful comparisons among managed
care organizations.139  Government efforts to encourage the development of
health maintenance organizations included some information mandates, requir-
ing HMOs to disclose covered benefits and exclusions, procedures that must be
followed to access care, grievance procedures, and the identity of participating
providers.140  Although this information was necessary to consumers’ under-
standing of their health care coverage, it was insufficient to enable them to
assess accurately the medical outcomes afforded by competing plans in com-
parison with the price charged to enroll in each.141  Because competition among
plans to secure the business of employer-purchasers centered primarily on cost
of coverage rather than on quality of health care, there was little incentive to
develop the means to measure, and therefore to manage, health care results.  In
the absence of comprehensive information about the relative quality and cost of
care, as well as the methods used to control cost by limiting use of health care
services, reliance on consumer choice to reflect actual consumer preferences
was misplaced.
138. For a discussion of how and why employers’ and employees’ interests might diverge, see Erica
Worth Harris, The Regulation of Managed Care: Conquering Individualism and Cynicism in America, 6
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 315, 363-64 (discussing agency problems).
139. In a study published in 1998 by the General Accounting Office (GAO), the GAO concluded
that consumers were not routinely provided with information about the business practices, financial
arrangements, or service performance of the managed care organizations from which they received
health care benefits.  HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND HUMAN SERVICES DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE,  REP. NO. HEHS-98-137, CONSUMER HEALTH CARE INFORMATION: MANY
QUALITY COMMISSION DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT CURRENT PRACTICE (Report to
Congressional Requesters) 3-4 (1998).
140. 42 C.F.R. § 417.124(b) (2001).
141. Health care quality is difficult to define and more difficult to measure.  Ideal comparisons
would examine actual health care outcomes achieved in comparison with the health care outcomes that
were possible with medical intervention for the measured population.  Not all diseases can be
prevented or cured, and not all symptoms can be alleviated.  Meaningful data would reflect those
preventable conditions that were prevented, those curable conditions that were cured, and those
incurable that were cared for and made comfortable.  See Walter McClure, Health Care Reform Under
the ‘Buy Right’ Strategy, MED. GROUP MGMT. J.,  Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 16, 23, 76-78 (1993) (discussing
the redefinition of the “health care product” as “health results”) [hereinafter McClure, Buy Right].
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Finally, proponents of market-based reform acknowledged that consumers
must have a personal financial stake, bearing the brunt of a costly choice while
reaping the reward of economical ones, to make cost-conscious coverage and
care decisions.  The HMO Act mandate envisioned equal employer contribu-
tions to traditional coverage options and newly offered health maintenance
organizations.  But fixed dollar subsidies did not become customary practice.
At least for a time, many employers who made health coverage available to
their employees continued to pay 80 to 100% of the premium.142  There is evi-
dence, however, that this practice is changing.  In 1996, employees paid about
30% of the premium for family coverage and 22% for single coverage.143
Between 1985 and 1995, the percentage of employees who received single cov-
erage at no cost to them dropped from 64% to 33%.144
Impediments remain, however, to consumers’ having a true economic stake
in their choices.  When employers shifted from more to less costly coverage
options, they typically retained the savings, rather than sharing them with
employees who selected less costly alternatives.145  Moreover, Congress has
failed to reform the tax laws, with the result that employees’ preferences for
coverage remain skewed by their ability to purchase health care through their
employers’ health benefit plans with pre-tax dollars.  In the end, consumers
were left without a financial stake in their decision.  Without the potential for
personal savings, consumers had little incentive to support health care spending
controls.146
C. The Insurance Industry Takeover of Managed Care Reform
Managed care did not become a major force in health care delivery and
financing for more than a decade after the enactment of the HMO Act, when
employers rebelled—seemingly en masse—against the ever-increasing cost of
their health benefit plans.  For a time thereafter, HMOs enjoyed steady
increases in enrollment as employers moved away from traditional indemnity
coverage.147  As market demand for HMOs increased, large commercial insurers
saw the emerging trend and assumed center stage in market-based reform.
The traditional customer base of large commercial insurers was equally
large commercial enterprises.  National employers demanded that the commer-
142. Gold, supra note 132, at 7.
143. Larry Levitt & Janet Lundy, Kaiser Family Found., Trends and Indicators in the Changing
Health Care Marketplace 35 (1998), at http://www.kff.org/content/archive/1429/trends.pdf (last visited
Apr. 4, 2002).
144. Id. at 35.
145. See Enthoven et al., Consumer Choice, supra note 23, at 3 (noting that individual consumers
did not share in the financial savings realized by their employers from health maintenance
organizations).
146. See McClure, Medical Care System, supra note 16, at 51-54 (criticizing a national health
insurance system funded by the government on the ground that consumers will not support cost control
without a personal economic stake).
147. INTERSTUDY PUBLICATIONS, HMO TREND REPORT 4, at http://interstudy
publications.com/pdf/trendpr.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2002).
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cial insurers develop plans in all the employers’ locations.  Eager to respond to
their long-standing customers, commercial insurers developed HMOs in areas
not suitable for profitable operation.  Insurers frequently did not seek federal
qualification for these HMO subsidiaries, giving them more flexibility in benefit
design.  Employers also encouraged commercial insurers to develop extensive
provider networks to avoid disrupting employees’ long-standing physician rela-
tionships.  The pressure to offer large provider panels was enhanced when an
insurer’s products were the sole option available to a customer’s employees.
Anxious for product differentiation and a label that could be applied to a
range of benefit designs, commercial insurers adopted the generic term “man-
aged care” to describe health benefit products that attempted to control the cost
of care by restricting choice of provider or use of medical services.  As a result,
various managed care models, which were quite different from the early HMOs,
proliferated.  With large panels of providers and flexible benefits packages,
insurers transformed the world of employee health benefits and brought man-
aged care to larger and larger portions of the American workforce.
Entrepreneurial companies entered the managed care business, taking
advantage of opportunities to offer their products to local employers that were
less committed to the large commercial carriers.  Many of these new market
entrants responded to market demand more quickly than old-line commercial
insurers.  They had strong marketing expertise and were able to accumulate
large amounts of capital through public stock offerings.  For the first time,
HMOs and other managed care organizations became wealth-generating busi-
nesses.
With the credibility of the insurance industry solidly behind the managed
care revolution, employers began to rethink their employee health benefits
strategies.  Faced with rapidly escalating health insurance costs, major employ-
ers began to replace their traditional indemnity coverage with the managed care
plans now offered by commercial carriers and to require all employees to
enroll.148  To avoid expensive and burdensome state regulation and to take
advantage of experience rating, many companies also decided to self-insure,
contracting with carriers to administer their plans.
As employers and commercial carriers transformed the landscape of
employee benefits, they also transformed the managed care industry.  Point-of-
service plans, viewed as the ultimate compromise between indemnity insurance
and restricted forms of coverage, slowed the growth of traditional HMOs.  With
point-of-service options, employees had the option to use network providers in
exchange for broad benefits and low out-of-pocket costs or use providers out-
side the network for fewer benefits and higher out-of-pocket costs.  Since point-
of-service plans offered many of the cost containment benefits of a tightly man-
aged network and the freedom of choice that many employees coveted, they
were very appealing to employers.  Insurers marketed point-of-service plans
148. See Levitt & Lundy, supra note 143, at 24-34.
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with the objective of replacing competing HMOs and regaining their position as
the sole carriers for large employer customers.
Responding to a growing managed care marketplace required huge capital
expenditures.  To offset large start-up costs, insurers had to generate managed
care enrollment quickly and produce profits comparable to those earned from
their traditional insurance products.  Some insurance companies and Blue
Cross/Blue Shield plans found it difficult to meet demanding market require-
ments and remain profitable.  During the 1980s and 1990s, insurer-sponsored
HMO losses were substantial.149  Companies such as Metropolitan Life and
Travelers were unable to compete profitably in the intricate world of managed
care and abandoned the health insurance business.150
During the 1990s, managed care plans responded to new health care dynam-
ics driven in large part by the introduction of Wall Street into the health care
market reform.  To gain market share, many plans engaged in aggressive pric-
ing, which was unsustainable over the long term.151  Smaller plans merged or
were purchased by larger plans to achieve fast membership growth, in search of
economies of scale, and to gain the advantage needed to negotiate favorable
contracts with providers.152  The consolidation trend left a small number of large
competitors in each community and reduced consumers’ options.  To satisfy the
market’s demand for broad provider access, plans contracted with the majority
of physicians and hospitals, essentially eliminating competition among provid-
ers.  Most plans became seemingly undifferentiated commodities.
While profit margins and growth in the early 1990s were high enough to
interest Wall Street investors, profits were eroded by the financial burdens asso-
ciated with fast growth, regulatory requirements, rapid expansion and con-
solidation, increased health care costs, and managing large physician networks.
From 1995 to 1999, the most profitable plans had margins just above break-
even, while many plans generated losses in the range of 3% to 13% of total
revenue.153  Compounding the problem was the decline in enrollment growth
rates.  From 1998 to 2000, national HMO growth dropped from 14% to 0.5%.154
Not surprisingly, the stock prices of many of the publicly held plans dropped
sharply, and some of Wall Street’s most vocal managed care supporters began
to voice concern about the future of the industry.
The managed care revolution required the business expertise of the insur-
ance industry, health care entrepreneurs, and funding from the capital markets
to shape the industry to marketplace needs.  In the interests of rapid start-up,
149. See IAN MORRISON, HEALTH CARE IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: VISION, VALUES, AND
LEADERSHIP 19 (2000); Howard Veit, Managed Care: Still the Best Alternative for Employers, HUM.
RESOURCES PROF., Mar.-Apr. 1989.
150. MORRISON, supra note 149, at 20.
151. See Allan Baumgarten, Trend Note: HMO Enrollment, Part 2: Focus on Commercial Plans, at
http://www.allanbaumgarten.com/cfusion/view_news.cfm?id=35 (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
152. MORRISON, supra note 149, at 20.
153. InterStudy Competitive Edge, HMO Industry Report 10.2 (2000).
154. InterStudy Competitive Edge, Regional Market Analysis 10.2 (2000).
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adapting to the market, and achieving enrollment growth, new market entrants
did not adopt the founding principles of the prepaid group practice plans.
Although prepaid group practice plans continued to exist, they lost market
share to commercial carriers selling or administering a range of health benefit
products, creating the now-familiar alphabet soup of HMOs, PPOs (preferred
provider organizations), POS (point-of-service plans), and EPOs (exclusive
provider options) among others.  The managed care industry had established its
future separate from the goals of the early HMO pioneers and the visions of
Paul Ellwood and other delivery system reform advocates.
D. The Fate of a Dual Mission: Cost Control and Quality Improvement
The managed care industry promised to control health care spending while
improving patient outcomes and consumer satisfaction.155 At the height of its
popularity with employers, the industry was criticized for interfering with physi-
cians’ clinical decisions and not managing the quality of care.  As the media
began to report stories of alleged managed care abuses, surveys reflected a
public backlash against managed care: One survey reported that 58% of Ameri-
cans thought managed care hurt quality.156  While no credible evidence indicated
that quality of health care outcomes had deteriorated under managed care, or
that the managed care system delivered poorer quality care overall than the fee-
for-service system,157 the managed care industry was losing the confidence of the
public and even of some of its advocates.158
In an environment of managed care bashing, it was easy to overlook the
industry’s achievements.  The managed care industry did slow health care
spending.  Thirty years of data showed that managed care plans brought hospi-
tal costs under control by eliminating unnecessary hospital stays and by limiting
hospital lengths of stay.159  Moreover, by extending coverage to services pro-
vided in an outpatient setting, it reversed the artificial preference for in-patient
care that was created by indemnity insurance benefit designs.  By focusing on
clinical variability in physician practices, the shift to managed care forced the
elimination of some unnecessary care.160  It also provided a stabilizing force to
professional fees and institutional charges. There is also some evidence that
155. See, e.g., Enthoven, Fortune 500, supra note 71, at 37 (The “goal remains a reformed health care
delivery system . . . responding to powerful incentives to innovate in order to improve outcomes, patient
satisfaction and value for money.”)(emphasis in original).
156. MORRISON, supra note 149, at 76.
157. See Joseph Gottfried & Frank A. Sloan, The Quality of Managed Care: Evidence from the
Medical Literature, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (Autumn 2002).
158. Lisa Belkin, But What About Quality?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1996, §6 (Magazine), at 68 (Paul
Ellwood expressed his disappointment that employers seemed much more interested in cost
containment than in improved health care quality.).
159. See Congressional Budget Office, The Effects of Managed Care and Managed Competition 2
(1995) (HMO enrollees have lower hospital admission rates and fewer inpatient days than patients
enrolled in indemnity plans.).
160. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Predictable Managed Care Kvetch on the Rocky Road from
Adolescence to Adulthood, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 897, 903-05 (1999).
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managed care systems enhanced physicians’ cost-consciousness across their
practices.  For more than a decade, the escalation in health care spending
slowed substantially, and for a five-year period from 1993 to 1998 it appeared
almost to stop.161  The gains, however, are proving temporary.  During the year
2000, employers across the country experienced double-digit premium increases
as a result of higher-than-budgeted health care spending.162  They began that
escalation, however, with the enduring benefit of the temporary slowdown
achieved by the managed care industry.
From a quality perspective, managed care created an entry point for its
enrollees into a complex array of clinical services.  Although the concept of
physician-as-gatekeeper came to invoke negative images of physician-as-obsta-
cle, when the system was at its best, the designation of a primary care physician
ensured that managed care enrollees would have access to and a relationship
with a health care professional to track and coordinate their medical needs.163  If
the shift to managed care did not lead to the creation of an entirely integrated
delivery system, an individual patient-physician relationship served to mediate
some of the adverse effects of the still-fragmented system.  Although compre-
hensive data on the effects of managed care on medical practice are scarce, it is
likely that the restrictions of the managed care industry led to substantive
improvements in clinical care that extended beyond managed care enrollees.
The managed care industry demanded that physicians provide objective evi-
dence of clinical benefit from medical intervention, thereby eliminating the
conventional insurer’s deference to clinical practices that may have been little
more than “professional habit.”164  In the process, managed care plans encour-
aged and facilitated evidence-based medicine through their accumulation of
population-based outcomes data.  Health care quality can be improved when
information about best medical practices is identified and disseminated
throughout the professional community.165  During the 1990s, several voluntary
organizations proposed mechanisms and measures to assess the quality of
health plans,166 but they did not agree on a standard set of quality measures.  As
a result, the managed care industry confronted a costly burden to respond to
161. Clark C. Havighurst, The Backlash Against Managed Health Care: Hard Politics Makes Bad
Policy, 34 IND. L. REV. 395, 396, 396 n.4 (2001) [hereinafter Havighurst, Backlash]; Clark C.
Havighurst, Is the Health Care Revolution Finished?—A Forward, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1
(Autumn 2002).
162. See Kaiser Family Found. & Health Research & Educ. Trust, Employer Health Benefits
Annual Survey 2 (2001) (premiums increased by an average of eleven percent in 2001), at
http://www.kff. org/content/20010906a/HRETChartpack.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2002).  The annual
2001 Towers Perrin Health Care Cost Survey also found that the cost of large employers’ health benefit
plans increased about thirteen percent on average in 2001, the highest year-over-year percentage
increase in more than a decade.  Towers Perrin, 2001 Health Cost Survey 3, 5 (2001).
163. See Havighurst, Backlash, supra note 161, at 397 (noting improved accessibility and continuity
of care).
164. See William M. Sage, Physicians as Advocates, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 1529, 1578-79 (1999).
165. Id. at 1577.
166. These included the National Committee for Quality Assurance, the Joint Commission on the
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, and some employer coalitions and quality consultants.
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myriad diverse, sometimes duplicative, efforts to measure and monitor qual-
ity.167
Market-based reform proved an imperfect mechanism for quality improve-
ment.  The marketplace provided only disincentives to excel in caring for the
very sick.  An organization that managed the care of seriously or chronically ill
patients exceptionally well risked attracting more than its actuarially predicted
share of costly cases.168  This marketplace disincentive to develop skills at pro-
viding high-quality, cost-effective care in complex cases created suspicion
among vulnerable patients.  An opportunity to improve quality and control
health care spending on the costliest cases was lost.
Some comprehensive quality initiatives fell victim to a market that empha-
sized cost-based competition.169  Unlike the prepaid group practice plans on
which the managed care revolution was founded, many newly created plans that
resulted from the insurer takeover of the managed care industry lacked the
infrastructure to initiate quality improvement programs and intervene in the
quality of care delivered by their widely dispersed independent providers.170
Employers did not perceive quality as a critical issue and showed little inclina-
tion to direct employees to plans with the infrastructure to manage quality of
care.  In the absence of purchaser demand, competition on the basis of quality
failed to materialize.
VIII
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Too often discussions of health care reform resort to utopian or simplistic
solutions.  Certainly, the nation’s health care system has not achieved medical
nirvana, nor is it likely to do so.  Both returning to a mythical past and staying
the current course, however, are untenable.  The complexity of medical science
and technology outpaced the technical abilities and financial means of kindly
167. MORRISON, supra note 149, at 57-62.
168. In contrast, physicians in a fee-for-service system were rewarded for their superior efforts.
And, even when those incentives are moderated by managed care organizations, physicians continue to
reap the psychic rewards and professional prestige for clinical management of complex cases.  In the
absence of personal financial disincentives, such non-financial rewards may be sufficient.  This reward
system is to be encouraged, because it is desirable that the sickest people are directed to the caregivers
with the most skill in caring for them.
169. MORRISON, supra note 149, at 79.
170. Howard Veit, co-author of this article, served as a consultant to many prepaid group practice
plans during this period.  Many of these plans had well-publicized quality improvement programs and
had initiated disease management programs to improve health care outcomes for several specific
conditions.  Veit observed, however, that, in light of the market conditions and the resulting loss of
market share, the group practice plans had to make critical and gut-wrenching decisions.  Should they
risk fighting against market pressures and remain a limited network, quality oriented plan?
Alternatively, should they direct limited resources to enlarging their provider networks, often into new
geographic areas?  Survival often meant opting to increase their networks.  Management teams all over
the country made a clear choice to satisfy the market with plenty of access, knowing that this choice
might force them to de-emphasize their priority on quality management.  Many of these plans still
struggle to allocate sufficient resources to keep quality management programs alive, while others have
significantly reduced or eliminated these programs.
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country doctors long ago.  Cost has always mattered: An earlier era merely
offered fewer sellers and fewer services for purchase.  The level of health care
spending that would result from a present-day cost-unconscious health care
delivery system would soon outstrip society’s ability to fund health care, until
eventually only the most profitable enterprises and the wealthiest citizens
would be able to afford health care coverage or medical services.  The concept
of managed care was based on a planned shift of ultimate power to individual
consumers who were to have the choice and the information about cost and
quality to make wise, economical selections.  Armed with the tools of the mar-
ketplace and freed from the perverse incentives of indemnity insurance and fee-
for-service medicine, consumers and caregivers were going to reshape health
care delivery and financing.  But the conditions precedent failed, the
stakeholders did not behave as predicted, and the result is not to anyone’s
liking.
As an approach to improving the status quo, both the body politic and the
general populace have exhibited a clear preference for evolution over revolu-
tion.171  There is no evidence of the political will or public commitment to con-
front fundamental change to a market-based health care delivery and financing
system.  Nor is there any persuasive evidence that another alternative would be
more beneficial.172  Evolutionary aims are modest: to right missteps and make
moderate changes of course in search of net improvement among admittedly
imperfect alternatives.  The managed care industry, despite its flaws, has access
to substantial capital, organizational capabilities, and technology to enable it to
improve services and contribute to efforts to control health care spending.  The
task for modern day would-be reformers is to design and propose targeted
interventions to address imperfections in the current system.  We offer here a
few modest suggestions.
A. Patient Self-Help
Renewed calls for health care reform come at a time when unprecedented
amounts of medical information are available to consumers.  In this environ-
ment, patient self-help could yield modest cost reductions.  In the colonial
period and throughout the time that predated widespread health care insurance,
health care was provided primarily through self-help and family assistance, with
the information offered by newspapers and almanacs.173  That practice dimin-
ished as access to professional care, scientific knowledge, and medical technol-
ogy expanded.  Today, the Internet and the medical information that it has
made available have led to a renaissance of colonial-age beliefs that ordinary
171. The rejection of overhaul proposals, from the 1970s plans of Senator Edward Kennedy to the
1990s proposal of President Clinton, provide persuasive evidence for this assertion.
172. See David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 23, 24 (2001) (noting that one of the shortcomings of the
managed care backlash has been the failure of most commentators to appreciate the benefits of existing
arrangements and the trade-offs associated with the preferred alternatives).
173. STARR, supra note 6, at 32.
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people are competent to treat many minor illnesses without physician or other
specialty intervention.174  In 1980, Alain Enthoven cited a study by the National
Center for Health Statistics in which physicians reported that 48.5% of all
patient office visits were for problems that were not serious and did not require
expert intervention.175  Although physician charges account for only a relatively
small percentage of total health care expenditures,176 informed self-help for
minor ailments offers an opportunity for savings.177  In addition, individuals who
have the capacity to educate themselves about their medical needs and use the
information and tools available to them will be better partners to cost-conscious
physicians when they require medical intervention.
B. Facilitating Quality-Based Competition
If individuals are to take a more active role in managing their own health,
they must have better information with which to judge the comparative quality
of care.  The current managed care marketplace measures the cost of coverage
without a reliable comparison to the quality of care delivered in exchange.  If
managed care organizations and caregivers are going to compete based on
quality as well as cost, they must first measure quality using reliable information
about medical outcomes.178
Walter McClure has made a persuasive case for adopting his “buy right”
strategy in which purchasers would base their spending decisions on the best
available information about medical outcomes and competitive pressures would
induce caregivers to produce reliable data.179  Some employers have formed
“The Leapfrog Group” to use their purchasing power to motivate health plans
and providers to reduce the incidence of medical errors, basing their purchasing
decisions on medical outcome evidence.180  To date, however, most purchasers
have seemed content to make their decisions on the basis of cost, coupled with
the absence of any evidence of poor quality outcomes.  The principal private
accrediting agency for managed care plans, the National Committee on Quality
Assurance, has focused on inputs and process measures, rather than medical
outcomes, and has conceded that it does not measure the quality of care actu-
174. See Leah Beth Ward, Web Plays a Huge Role as Health Advisor, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Nov. 27, 2000, at 1D (reporting that fifty-five percent of Americans with Internet access use the Web to
retrieve health or medical information).
175. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN, supra note 20, at 31.
176. Id. at 31-32 (reporting that physicians’ charges accounted for eighteen percent of the total at
the time of the study).
177. See ANNE R. SOMERS, HEALTH CARE IN TRANSITION: DIRECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 79-85
(1971) (indicating a need for consumer health education).
178. See, e.g., Paul M. Ellwood, Outcomes Management: A Technology of Patient Experience, 99th
Shattuck Lecture to the Annual Meeting of the Massachusetts Medical Society (May 21, 1988), in 318
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1549, 1550 (1988) (describing information as the “central nervous system” of
modern medicine).
179. McClure, Buy Right, supra note 141.
180. See Hyman & Hall, supra note 172, at 34-35 (also discussing the Pacific Business Group on
Health).
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ally provided to enrollees of the plans it reviews.181  In the absence of purchaser
demand, health plans do not compete on the basis of the quality of outcomes,
over which they have little direct control.  In the absence of demand, medical
professionals have little impetus to produce the kind of medical outcome data
that would subject providers to uncomfortable public scrutiny.  The system
seems to have settled into a socially undesirable stasis.
There is much truth in the adage that medicine follows Medicare.  The fed-
eral and state governments should become active participants in McClure’s buy-
right strategy, basing their purchasing decisions on data about the quality of
medical interventions and the incidence of medical error.182  This strategy could
be applied to individual and institutional caregivers through selective contract-
ing, as well as to managed care plans that wish to offer their products to gov-
ernment beneficiaries.
Producing severity-adjusted medical outcomes data, however, will be a
complex and costly undertaking.  The federal government can use its awards of
research grants and federal funding to facilitate the development of medical
outcomes measures as it creates a demand for that information through its pur-
chasing decisions.  If usable methods to measure medical outcomes were more
widely available, private purchasers would likely follow the government lead in
using data to make purchasing decisions and providing them to employees for
their individual choices.
The ultimate goal should be a national medical database for a broad range
of medical conditions to which all market participants have access.  The gov-
ernment should require managed care organizations, payers, and providers to
produce information that would build this national database.  Although some
data exist, there is no centralized effort to standardize or stimulate data collec-
tion and storage.  Moreover, no systematic efforts have been made to update
available data to reflect new information and new technologies.  It is unlikely
that market competitors will engage in the kind of collaborative endeavor that
would be required to undertake a task of this magnitude.  National leadership
and federal expenditures are essential.
C. Empowering Consumer Choice
Health plans must compete for the business of individual consumers in the
context of the existing group-based system.  Despite the shortcomings of the
employer-based insurance system, a group-purchasing model offers information
and marketplace advantages for individual consumers.183  Health care coverage
181. See Margaret E. O’Kane, NCQA: Using Market Pressure to Promote Quality in Managed Care,
in THE CHALLENGE OF REGULATING MANAGED CARE 142, 146 (John E. Billi & Gail B. Agrawal
eds., 2001) (noting that NCQA’s accreditation strategy is to evaluate systems and processes).
182. A shift from claims-payer to value purchaser of medical services will likely require changes in
federal and state law.  It will also require political will.  See Robert A. Berenson & Dean M. Harris,
Using Managed Care Tools in Traditional Medicare: Should We? Could We?, 65 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 140 (Autumn 2002).
183. For a comparative institutional analysis of an employment-based insurance system, see Hyman
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is complex.  Use of an agent to gather information about plan options, evaluate
coverage and cost, and present information to individual consumers is more
efficient than placing that burden on each individual.  If quality information
became available, group purchasers would be more likely than individual con-
sumers to use the data to make purchasing decisions.184  Group purchasing also
enhances the market power of the consumer in bargaining with the carrier.
One need only examine the market for individual coverage to discover use of
competitive strategies that could drive the nation ever further from universal
coverage: risk selection to deny coverage to those who are most likely to
require care and discontinuance of coverage when risks materialize.185  The crea-
tion of private purchasing associations to assume the functions currently per-
formed by employers would take time, increase costs, and likely involve
different shortcomings.  Many of the imperfect agency problems with an
employer-based model can be alleviated by modest changes to the current
system.  While such modifications might be difficult, they are more easily
achievable than wholesale change to the way health benefits are delivered to
the working population.
Purchasers should increase the number and types of choices that they make
available to their employees or other group members.186  Failure to do so will
ensure a system in which carriers are responsive to purchasers rather than to
patients.  Many purchasers have so far proved themselves disinclined to take
these steps voluntarily, and individual carriers have many incentives to discour-
age them from doing so.187  Lawmakers might revisit the market-mandate as a
means to bolster competition if employers failed to offer voluntarily a desig-
nated number of different benefit designs to their employees.  A reinstituted
and revised statutory mandate, similar to the one used in the federal HMO Act,
could be made available to conventional insurers as well as to a full range of
alternative financing and delivery models to facilitate competition at the indi-
vidual consumer level by requiring groups to offer a wide range of options.  To
minimize disruption to the annual enrollment period, options could be closed
after an employer offers a single open access model, including indemnity or pre-
& Hall, supra note 172.
184. See Kaiser Family Found., National Survey on Americans as Health Care Consumers: An
Update on the Role of Quality Information 4 (2000) (finding that people report reliance on
recommendations of friends and family rather than on standardized quality indicators; only one in ten
report using quality information), available at
http://www.kff.org/content/2000/3093/AHRQToplines.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2002).  The survey’s
results are predictable due to the complexity of analyzing such data and the emotion-laden tradeoffs
that are involved in choices about medical care.  See Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care
“Patient Protection” Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 51-55 (1999).
185. See Alain C. Enthoven, Managed Competition in Health Care and the Unfinished Agenda, in
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., 1986 Ann. Supplement, at 105, 107-110 (discussing competitive
strategies in the individual coverage market).
186. See Enthoven et al., Backlash, supra note 23, at 7-8.
187. In 1997, fifty-three percent of employees in large firms and twenty percent in small firms were
offered a choice among plans, and this choice did not necessarily include different types of plans.  See
Gold, supra note 132, at 9.
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ferred provider organization plans, two health maintenance organizations or
other closed panel plans, and a safety valve plan, like the current point-of-serv-
ice options that permit patients to seek care outside the network of contracted
providers at increased cost.
An expanded choice of plans at the group level might also decrease the
pressure on health plans to create ever wider networks of providers and
increase the competition among health plans with different network configura-
tions.  Differential premium structures between plans with larger panels and
those with more manageable small closed panels would lead to consumer choice
based on price, if consumers are permitted to retain the savings.  Smaller net-
works should also increase competition among caregivers to participate in alter-
native delivery and financing plans.  And if a trend toward smaller networks is
coupled with greater quality-based competition, more progress might be made
toward the creation of truly integrated clinical care.
Even a multiplicity of choices will not produce informed competition at the
level of individual consumers without meaningful information about those
choices.  Consumers should be informed about the techniques, organizational
forms, and incentives that characterize each of their options, as well as about
the cost of coverage and quality of care provided by each managed care plan.188
Private accreditation agencies could be used to create standards for, and to
oversee information disclosure by, managed care plans.  Proposed federal
patient protection legislation would require more complete disclosure of plan
rules than is now customary.189  If federal law is amended to permit a wider array
of judicial challenges to health plan practices, full disclosure in a format rea-
sonably intended to inform consumers should provide a defense to any cause of
action based on truth in advertising or consumer protection statutes.
Market and information mandates offer improvements, but not universal
solutions.  Self-insured plans typically rely on a single benefit design managed
by a third party administrator with specified limits on discretionary use of plan
assets.  Information about a single option provides little more than an alert to
consumers to take precautions to protect their own interests, although even this
information might be useful.  When an employer plan does not offer any
insured product designs, the proposed mandate will not foster competition, at
least not in the short term.  It is possible that, as alternative delivery and financ-
ing systems offer greater benefits in quality and cost than a self-insured
employer could achieve operating its own plan, employers may again elect to
focus on their core businesses, insure health care risks, and allow others to
manage them.  Similarly, a mandate fosters competition only if payers elect to
188. Jacob S. Hacker & Theodore R. Marmor, The Misleading Language of Managed Care, 24 J.
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1033, 1038-1042 (1999) (arguing that payers should not rely on “slogans” but
should be required to provide meaningful information in accurate terms).
189. See Bipartisan Patient Protection Act, S. 1052 and H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. §121 (2001).  The
President also supports federal disclosure provisions.  See Letter from the President to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives and the Senate Majority Leader, Feb. 7, 2001, at
http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/20010207-4.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
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utilize it, but they are unlikely to do so with small groups or groups with unfa-
vorable experience.  Over time, purchasing cooperatives might be formed that
combine these groups into organizations that are more attractive to payers, and
competition for their business will ensue. 190  To the extent that managed care
organizations are prompted to compete on the basis of selection by the individ-
ual consumer in some groups, they will be more likely to engage in the same
activities across their benefit lines as a means of controlling administrative costs.
D. Confronting a Role for Physicians
Physicians have an unavoidable role in controlling health care spending and
achieving cost-effective clinical care.191  Their decisions have always dictated
much of health care spending, and even if consumers assume a larger role in
their own health care, reliance on medical judgment is inevitable in the complex
cases that account for the majority of health care spending.  In addition, physi-
cians are in the best position to assess different patient preferences and func-
tional needs and to educate patients about the incremental gains or risks associ-
ated with additional increments of clinical intervention.  They are also going to
be essential to any broad-based effort to collect medical outcomes data.
In 1970, Ellwood stated:
[I]t is the indispensability of the physician’s judgment that makes it unlikely that the
price regulation approach can succeed.  Only the physician can determine what care is
necessary, and therefore, only [s]he can eliminate unneeded expense.  The physician
cannot be policed to do so, but must be motivated by professional ethics, and by
organizational arrangements which align . . .  [the physician’s] economic incentives
with those of the consumer.192
The managed care industry assumed, mistakenly, that a change in physician
financial incentives alone could do what direct price regulation could not.  As
managed care organizations confront adverse publicity and increased liability
exposure, they are returning some control over medical decision-making to
attending physicians and their patients.  The focus is once again on the role of
the caregiver in assuring wise use of resources.
History has proved that merely changing reimbursement strategies does not
change medical practice.  To control health care spending, physicians must have
professional, as well as financial, incentives.  Cost-increasing behavior was
caused not only by economic incentives but also by psychic rewards of satisfying
patient demand and the professional prestige associated with highly specialized
technological care.193  Physicians’ mores must change to embrace new roles and
to reward cost-effective clinical decision-making.  They must have information
upon which to base cost-conscious decisions about which treatments are effica-
190. Clinton’s defeated health reform plan included an analogous provision.
191. See Victor R. Fuchs, Economics, Values, and Health Care Reform, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 17
(1996) (discussing an economist’s view of the role of physicians in health care spending control).
192. ELLWOOD, THE HEALTH MAINTENANCE STRATEGY, supra note 43, at 7.
193. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN, supra note 20, at 16 (financial incentives are reinforced by patient
expectation and prestige).
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cious and the costs associated with the range of alternative interventions.  Phy-
sician education must extend to the realm of public health and epidemiology to
teach future physicians to develop skills in predicting the needs of popula-
tions.194  This evolution of medical practice will not be a simple one, nor is it
likely to occur by pronouncement or legal fiat.  If continual improvement in
cost-effective clinical care is to occur, however, it is an essential one.  Unless
providers can be persuaded or required to redirect their energy into innovative
approaches to manage medical practice, the health system will be left with a
medical management vacuum that cannot easily be filled by other stakeholders.
E. Re-examining Comprehensive Coverage and Patient Cost Sharing
The benefit designs offered to consumers have become static.  They tend to
be based on comprehensive coverage for all “medically necessary” services with
limited cost sharing.  There is little differentiation within design categories and
a dearth of low-cost options.  The indemnity plans against which managed care
plans were to compete have largely disappeared from the marketplace.  Con-
sumers who would prefer not to shift the risk of routine care or who do not
want, or cannot afford, to purchase a comprehensive benefit package of man-
aged services have few meaningful alternatives in the current marketplace.  The
proposed patients’ bill of rights legislation does nothing to remedy this problem
and, to the extent that it expands mandatory coverage and thereby further
restricts choice, might exacerbate it.195
In the period immediately following the establishment of the Medicare and
Medicaid programs, society had accepted, in principle, that health care coverage
should be universal, comprehensive, and begin with the first dollar of expendi-
ture.196  The health maintenance organization concept was built upon a delivery
model in which all or a substantial part of health care services would be deliv-
ered or coordinated by a closed group of physicians.  In that model, consumers
were presumed to purchase care rather than coverage.  The professional staff
would provide the medical management necessary to ensure cost effectiveness,
and patient financial incentives to avoid excess utilization were deemed unnec-
essary.197  Instead, many managed care benefit designs are offered by organiza-
tions with little capacity to integrate or manage clinical care.  Additionally,
ERISA ensured that health plans participating in private employer-sponsored
194. The Institute of Medicine identified this problem in 1974.  See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra
note 59, at 30 (as a result of medical education’s focus on acute episodic care, physicians are poorly
trained to conserve resources while providing good quality care to the patient over a period of time).
195. Among the areas of consensus in House and Senate bills passed during the 107th Congress are
mandatory access to out-of-network specialists in some circumstances, mandatory coverage for
emergency care when a “prudent layperson” would believe such care was required, and continuation of
access to a caregiver who leaves the network.  See STEPHANIE LEWIS, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL
PATIENTS’ BILL OF RIGHTS DEBATE 5 (2001), at http://www.kff.org/content/2001/3179/
DebatePaper.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
197. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN, supra note 20, at 33-34 (discussing his views of why coinsurance
and deductibles were an ineffective means of cost control).
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health benefit plans would not be held legally accountable for the quality of
care provided under their auspices, thereby eliminating an important incentive
for active quality management.198
In the current managed care environment, consumers are typically pur-
chasing coverage rather than services.  Alternatives to the comprehensive cov-
erage packages should be given an opportunity to compete in the marketplace.
Just as proponents of health care system reform recommended that consumers
have financial incentives to make cost-conscious coverage selections, consumer
cost-sharing offers a means to encourage cost-conscious clinical choices as well.
The use of copayments and coinsurance would ensure that patients do not view
medical care as a free service, thus reducing, albeit modestly, the moral hazard
associated with third-party coverage.  A sliding scale of copayment amounts
and coinsurance percentages could be incorporated into coverage design to
reinforce the use of cost-effective clinical options: Patients who accept the least
costly alternative would have higher coverage levels than those who opt for
more costly options.  Patients who share the financial consequences of their
choices are more likely both to accept lower-cost care and to be satisfied with
their decision.199  The knowledge that patients bear some of the costs of their
care will restore an element of physician cost-consciousness that was lost when
third-party payment gained dominance.  And if that fails to have the desired
effect, cost-conscious patients are more likely to bargain with their physicians
over medical charges.
The resistance to the use of consumer contributions to the cost of their own
care is based, at least in part, on a paternalistic notion that the health care
financing system can and should protect patients from themselves.  Advocates
of comprehensive coverage for all argue that consumers who are asked to con-
tribute to the cost of their own care will avoid preventive and routine care,
thereby putting themselves at higher risk for serious illnesses which are more
costly to treat.  The risk of undetected serious illness or occurrence of prevent-
able illness should provide strong personal motivations to seek appropriate
medical care.  Society will continue to provide the safety net of comprehensive
coverage coupled with minimal out-of-pocket expenses to some segments of the
population.  Until society is prepared to provide for universal coverage, the cur-
rent system is ill-equipped to protect everyone from his or her own foibles.
Coverage options incorporating cost sharing do not offer a panacea.  They
198. The proposed federal patient protection legislation would restore accountability by mandating
external review for certain kinds of health plan decisions and providing consumers who are harmed by
their health plans a right to sue for damages.  Although both the House and Senate bills provide for
these remedies, they are the subjects of key differences that, if any legislation is to be enacted, will have
to be resolved in committee.  See LEWIS, supra note 195, at 5-8.  While consumers might regain some
lost confidence from the ability to seek redress, this accountability might well have the unintended
effect of increasing the number of uninsured Americans and discouraging innovative means to control
health care spending.  A full discussion of this debate is beyond the scope of this paper.  See generally
David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: What’s Wrong with a Patient Bill of Rights, 73 S. CAL. L.
REV. 221 (2000).  For a comparison of federal proposals, see LEWIS, supra note 195.
199. Cf. Enthoven et al., Backlash, supra note 23, at 7-8.
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will be inappropriate for some segments of the population in all circumstances,
including Medicaid beneficiaries, dual Medicare and Medicaid eligibles, and
other low-income groups.  States or the federal government might elect to pro-
hibit them in such plans, or the private sector might elect not to offer them or
employers not to purchase them.  Societal protections or coverage differentials
could be devised to protect vulnerable populations.  For example, pediatric
services could be exempted from patient-pay obligations.  Despite Fuchs’s argu-
ment that physicians should not serve as “part-time amateur welfare administra-
tor[s],”200 in the absence of public financial assistance to the indigent, caregivers
have proved their willingness to waive patient-pay amounts when they are per-
mitted to do so.201
The use of patient-pay methods are also ill-suited for patients during epi-
sodes of serious illnesses, when clinical options might be fewer and patients
would be particularly burdened by acquiring information about the possible
consequences of their various options.202  The retention of annual maximums for
out-of-pocket expenditures should ensure that patient cost-sharing does not
continue throughout the course of treatment for serious or chronic illness.
Unless we are prepared to require the use of community rating to ensure that
the costs of caring for the ill are shared equally among the healthy and the sick,
it is unfortunate but inevitable that those who require more health care services
will bear at least some of the increased cost of those services.
The most significant challenge to patient cost-sharing will probably come
from labor unions and employees accustomed to current practices.  Long-held
expectations are slow to change.  An appreciation that employees pay the cost
of coverage through lower wages and other benefits might contribute to a will-
ingness to accept other coverage designs.  In the end, this is an issue that will
have to be worked out in each workplace.  This proposal is intended to facilitate
an increase in the number of options available to consumers, not to dictate any
consumer’s choice among the available options or to suggest that a benefit




The evolution to a managed care system did not achieve the complete, fun-
damental change in the health care delivery system that was envisioned by some
of its early proponents.  As the managed care movement evolved beyond the
200. See Fuchs, Traditional Practice, supra note 1, at 155.
201. Waivers of copayments or coinsurance sometimes constitute insurance fraud under state law or
an unlawful inducement under the Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act.
202. Some data suggest that patients are ill-equipped to make rational decisions when they are
seriously ill, making cost sharing particularly inappropriate.  Eric J. Cassell et al., Preliminary Evidence
of Impaired Thinking in Sick Patients, 134 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 1120, 1122 (2001) (judgment of
sick hospitalized patients approximates that of children younger than ten years old).
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prepaid group practice model, it focused primarily on methods used to spread
the cost of health care services.  Discounting fees and withholding payments as
a means to eliminate useless, duplicative, or wasteful health care services gener-
ated temporary savings, but those methods alone did not lead to sustained cost-
effective clinical practices.  The system continues to lack the information and
incentives necessary to cause consumers, patients, and physicians to make cost-
conscious clinical choices or to require payers to offer a wide range of benefit
options.  As the health-care industry evolves, the challenges to increase infor-
mation, options, and choice in a competitive marketplace remain to be resolved.
